

CURRICULUM FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS - A LOOK AT
THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL

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General Studies

by

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ABSTRACT

CURRICULUM FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS – A LOOK AT THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL, by Gerald John Leonard, LTC (RET), U.S. Army, 144 pages.

This research examines the curriculum content for Stability Operations presented during academic year (AY) 2006 to 2007 at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff School (CGSS) as part of the Army's Intermediate Level Education (ILE). Methodology involved examination of all terminal and enabling learning objectives for the common core course and the advanced operations and warfighting course (AOWC). The research determined the number of learning objectives dedicated to stability operations and whether those learning objectives are linked to an assessment to determine competency levels for stability operations. This study challenges the assumption that the CGSS curriculum for stability operations is sufficient to produce mid-career officers who are competent in full spectrum operations (FSO). The study uses qualitative research methods to determine requirements, uncover gaps, and provide recommendations. Data have been collected from analysis of Army doctrine and in depth study of relevant academic works, government directives, professional articles, books, and occasional papers. The initial recommendation is to better focus the learning objectives dedicated to stability operations and to create assessment instruments capable of measuring competency for stability operations.

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ACRONYMS

AAP	Advanced Application Program
AOWC	Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course
AY	Academic Year
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
C2	Command and Control
CGSC	Command and General Staff College
CGSS	Command and General Staff School
CGSOC	Command and General Staff Officers Course
COA	Course of Action
COE	Contemporary Operating Environment
DOD	Department of Defense
DRAG	Doctrinal Review and Approval Group
EOCCE	End of Core Course Exercise
FM	Field Manual
FMI	Field Manual Interim
FSO	Full Spectrum Operations
ILE	Intermediate Level Education
JAWS	Joint Advanced Warfighting Studies
JTF	Joint Task Force
MDMP	Military Decision Making Process
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
NSS	National Security Strategy
OPCF	Operations Career Field

QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SRO	Stability and Reconstruction Operations
SSTR	Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations
U.S.	United States

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.

DOD Directive 3000.05
Military Support for Stability, Security,
Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations

The transition by the United States (U.S.) Army from major combat operations to stability operations in Iraq in the spring of 2003 was not pretty. In fact, most of it was not even recognizable. After four years of critical examination, by numerous authors and think tanks, it is clear the transition plans to shift resources and focus from combat to stability operations, while adequately conceived, were poorly executed. Several unchecked planning assumptions, from the national level down to senior operational headquarters, are to blame.

For an army conducting large-scale combat operations, to transition to an army of occupation, is extremely difficult. This proved to be the case for the U.S. Army in Baghdad in April of 2003. Now faced with the task for the stability of Iraq and the security of its population, the Army found itself in unfamiliar waters without the aid of sound navigational charts. Cultural, religious, historical, economic and political ignorance, of the very country the U.S. Army now occupied, set all the wrong conditions. This lack of familiarity, combined with a poor understanding of transition plans, hoisted

upon the wrong size and composition of force, created textbook conditions for growing an insurgency over the spring and summer of 2003.

The removal of Saddam Hussein from authority resulted in a massive power vacuum that spawned several violent movements for control of the country and its resources. Rivalry along mostly ethnic and religious lines created tremendous instability in Iraq. The U.S. strategic political-military planning process failed to properly calculate this outcome and has since continued to mismanage the fallout. Stabilizing Iraq has proven to be yet another lesson relearned by the U.S. Army.

In spite of documented patterns of U.S. Army involvement in stability operations, the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff School (CGSS) curriculum remains sparse on the subject. As indicated in the Department of Defense (DOD) quote at the beginning of this chapter, stability operations are now a core mission equal to combat operations. The bulk of these operations will undoubtedly be a key Army responsibility in future joint land campaigns. Dr. Lawrence Yates cautions in Occasional Paper 15, *The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005*, "the US military should not regard the occurrence of such operations [stability] as an aberration, but as an integral part of its general and ongoing missions" (Yates 2005, 21).

Furthermore, one of several new responsibilities given to the Secretaries of the Military Departments by DOD Directive 3000.05 is to "ensure curricula in individual and unit training programs and service schools prepare personnel for stability operations" (DOD Directive 3000.05 2005, 10). As such, now is the time for the CGSS to properly address and give priority to the subject of stability operations in its curriculum.

The U.S. Army CGSS provides the Intermediate Level Education (ILE) for all U.S. Army majors. The ILE replaced the existing Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC) in 2003. The ILE course is also attended by U.S. sister services and over 100 international officers participate each academic year. The goal of ILE is to prepare career officers with a larger context of unified action--multi-service, interagency, and multinational operations (CGSOC Handbook 2006, 3). The stability operations environment will involve multi-service planning, involve U.S. government interagency coordination and multinational participation. What the CGSOC Handbook description suggests is CGSS; by way of ILE is the Army's best way to meet the new stability operations education requirement from DOD Dir. 3000.05 for the intermediate level.

The Army, as the land component provider to the joint force, has historically participated in stability operations and continues to do so. Stability operations are now a core mission for DOD. The question now is does the current CGSS curriculum contribute to the goal of developing leaders who are competent in stability operations?

The purpose of this study is to determine if the resident curriculum for operations career field Army officers (OPCF), at the U.S. Army CGSS, contributes to the Army's goal of developing leaders who are competent in stability operations.

The Army's ILE consists of two components, the Common Core Course and the Field Grade Credentialing Course or qualification course. The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) is the proponent for the development and delivery of the Common Core Course curriculum to all field grade officers, regardless of career field or component. Proponency for the credentialing courses resides with the career field

proponents, with the Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas being the proponent for the OPCF (CGSOC Handbook 2006, 3).

The common core course prepares field grade officers for leadership positions in Army, joint, multinational and interagency organizations executing full spectrum operations.

The common core course emphasizes:

1. Warfighting within full spectrum operations (FSO) and today's operational environment
2. Balance how to think versus what to think
3. Complex problem solving across FSO
4. Balanced focus on current and future operations and plans functions
5. Staff principles and concepts
6. Know how to synchronize actions to attain effects (principles and concepts)
7. Effects-oriented

The field grade-credentialing course for OPCF officers is the Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course (AOWC) conducted at Fort Leavenworth. This course develops officers with a warfighting focus for battalion and brigade command capable of conducting FSO in joint, multinational, and interagency environments.

AOWC emphasizes a warfighting focus through:

1. Integrated full spectrum scenario with execution centric focus
2. Simulation performance based execution
3. Theory and doctrine of war
4. Conduct of war - Army, Joint and Multinational operations

5. Command leadership and decision making in battle
6. Planning, synchronization and execution of operations
7. Division and Brigade exercises

These curricula descriptions and the over use of words such as “war,” “war-fighting focus,” and “battle” only serve to cultivate what may be argued as an outdated and disproportionate lethal mind-set. CGSS, as a flexible and learning organization, may do better in pursuing a greater balance among the lethal and non-lethal tasks within FSO. A greater inclusion of non-lethal focus with more emphasis on stability operations may be warranted. The current instructional time spent on the subject of stability operations can only be assumed, at this time, by the descriptor, “full spectrum operations,” which by its definition includes stability operations in campaigns overseas. The subject of stability operations is clearly absent in the previous course descriptions for the common core course or AOWC.

Stability operations have played a major role throughout the history of the U.S. Army from the Second Seminole War (1835-1842) to ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is only recently, in late 2005, that the DOD in general and the Army in particular began to formally recognize the importance of stability operations as an integral part of war on equal footing with offensive and defensive operations. In the past, stability operations were looked upon as something that happened separately from war and generally conducted as an economy of force effort. Stability operations have not been the focus of our force planning or educational needs review process. The Army can no longer afford to hold this myopic point of view or to educate its mid-grade officers along mostly lethal offensive and defensive lines of FSO.

Stability operations have gone by many names in the past, although the tasks and goals have remained mostly the same over the years. Familiar to most would be the term Military Operations Other than War or MOOTW. Military Operations Other Than War were defined as operations that “encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war” (JP 3-07 1995, GL-3). FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations* or SOSO, describes the following kinds of missions and operations as falling under the category of stability operations (2003, 1-2).

1. Peace Operations
2. Foreign Internal Defense
3. Security Assistance
4. Humanitarian and Civic Assistance
5. Support to Insurgencies
6. Support to Counter-drug Operations
7. Combating Terrorism
8. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
9. Arms Control
10. Show of Force

Found in the DRAG Edition (Doctrinal Review and Approval Group), 22 November 2006, of FM 3-0, *Full Spectrum Operations*, stability operations is now defined and described as, “operations that restore, establish, preserve, or exploit security and control over areas, populations, and resources. Stability operations usually

predominate in Peace Operations, Irregular Warfare and Peacetime Military Engagement and involve both coercive and cooperative actions by the military force” (FM 3-0 DRAG, 2006, 3-10). This edition of FM 3-0 defines five types of stability tasks found within a stability operation. They are as follows:

Civil Security: Civil security involves protecting the populace from external and internal threats. Simultaneously, they assist host-nation police and security elements as the host nation maintains internal security against criminals and small, hostile groups. Civil security is required for the other stability tasks to be effective.

Civil Control: Civil control regulates selected behavior and activities of individuals and groups. This control reduces risk and promotes security. Civil control channels the population’s activities to allow provision of security and essential services. A curfew is an example of civil control.

Restore Essential Services: Army forces establish or restore the most basic services and protect them until a civil authority or the host nation can provide them. Normally, Army forces support other government, intergovernmental, and host-nation agencies. When the host nation or other agency cannot perform its role, Army forces may provide the basics directly.

Essential services include the following:

1. Emergency medical care and rescue
2. Preventing epidemic disease
3. Providing food and water
4. Providing emergency shelter
5. Providing basic sanitation (sewage and garbage disposal)

Support to Governance: Stability operations establish conditions that enable interagency and host-nation actions to succeed. By establishing security and control, stability operations provide a foundation for transitioning authority to other government or intergovernmental agencies and eventually to the host nation. Once this transition is complete, commanders focus on transferring control to a legitimate civil authority according to the desired end state.

Support to governance includes the following:

1. Developing and supporting host-nation control of public activity, rule of law, and civil administration.

2. Maintaining security, control, and essential services through the host nation.

This includes training and equipping host-nation security forces and police.

3. Normalizing the succession of power (elections and appointment of officials).

Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development: Support to economic and infrastructure development helps a host nation develop capability and capacity in these areas. It may involve direct and indirect military assistance to local, regional, and national entities (FM 3-0, DRAG 2006, 3-10).

Along with efforts to update Army doctrine, there are several initiatives by both DOD and the Department of State to address the issue of how best the military services should conduct stability operations. These initiatives provide strategic level advocacy and have given the function of stability operations a considerable opportunity to compete for capability resources in a manner that before did not exist. The promulgation of these strategic level initiatives and directives is further demonstration of the growing importance of stability operations.

This first chapter is an introduction to stability operations, the U.S. CGSS and the Army's ILE program. It provides current and historical context with regard to stability operations in order to make obvious the U.S. Army's experience with and continuing involvement in stability operations. Chapter 2 will provide a review of relevant stability literature as it applies to this study. The goal will be to identify the most current and important philosophies on the topic and explore how other intermediate service schools are addressing stability operations in their curriculum.

Chapter 3, Methodology, will describe in detail the qualitative content analysis methodology used to examine CGSS stability operations curriculum. The methodology will look for stability operations content in the lesson plans of the common core curriculum and AOWC curriculum for academic year (AY) 2006-2007. The research will scan (using Word® Edit-Find tool) each lesson plan for nine key words: stability, civil security, civil control, essential services, governance, economic, infrastructure, transition, and reconstruction. These words were selected because they represent the five tasks for stability operations as described in FM 3-0, *Full Spectrum Operations* (DRAG Edition) November 2006.

If a key word does appear in a lesson plan that lesson plan will then be further analyzed to determine if the stability content of the lesson is significant. Significant in this case means that the subject of stability operations is a learning objective in the lesson plan and that learning objective is assessed. Once the analysis of curriculum is complete, final determination will be made on whether the stability operations content found in CGSS curriculum contributes to the Army's goal of developing leaders who are competent in stability operations.

Chapter 4 will present and interpret the evidence produced in chapter 3 and present what the study found in answering the primary and secondary research questions. The goal of chapter 4 is to present the depth of stability operations content presented in common core course and AOWC. Lastly, chapter 5 will contain the conclusions and recommendations that emerge from interpretation of the research evidence.

Research Questions

As the Army continues to adapt to the realities it now faces in the 21st century, the 2006 Army Posture Statement, calls for leaders who are more akin to a pentathlete--a leader who is able to “rapidly transition between complex tasks, within the full spectrum of operations” (Army Posture Statement 2006). The envisioned talents of this pentathlete are on a wide continuum from strategic and creative thinker, to a leader who is skilled in governance and diplomacy, and lastly, a leader who is competent in FSO. FSO in this case are defined as, “The combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations in joint campaigns and operations conducted overseas” (FM 3-0, DRAG 2006, 3-1).

The CGSS, as the Army’s Intermediate Staff School is responsible for providing that full spectrum education primarily to Army majors, in support of the Army’s efforts to grow adaptive and innovative leaders. An initial review of the current common core course and AOWC curriculum reveals solid evidence of subjects and studies concerning traditional offensive and defensive operations as a part of FSO. What is not so evident is the subject of stability operations. Thus, the primary research question has emerged. Does the resident curriculum for OPCF officers, at the U.S. Army CGSS, contribute to the Army’s goal of developing leaders who are competent in stability operations? In order to answer this primary question the following secondary questions will need to be answered:

1. What curriculum does the school currently present in stability operations?
 - a. Which blocks, modules or lessons mention stability operations as a part of the lesson plan?
 - b. Where in the lesson plan is stability mentioned?
 - c. Are stability operations a learning objective for the lessons in which they appear?
 - d. Is learning assessed where stability operations are a learning objective?
2. Are there shortfalls in the current stability operations curriculum when compared to the five types of stability operations tasks articulated in FM 3-0?
3. What should the ILE curriculum include regarding stability operations?

Assumptions

There are some essential assumptions necessary in order to conduct this study. The National Defense Strategy published in March 2005 provided the foundation for the *Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR 2006)*. To operationalize the National Defense Strategy a key priority for examination by the *QDR* was to Defeat Terrorist Networks. Therefore, the first assumption is that U.S. strategic policy will continue to drive the U.S. Army to conduct stability operations overseas as part of the continuing prosecution of the Global War on Terrorism to defeat terrorist networks.

The English military historian, Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart, is credited with saying, “The only thing more difficult than getting a new idea into the military mind is getting an old one out” (Charlton 1990, 65). The potential dangers aimed at the United States and its national security interests have changed dramatically since 1989 and even more so since the attacks of 11 September 2001. Yet it can be argued that the U.S.

Army's ILE has not kept pace with that change. To some degree, as an institution, the Army is guilty of holding on to "old ideas." Our strategies appear backward-looking rather than forward, critically thought out and purposeful. That rationale could be easily applied to curriculum content at CGSS. This leads to the second assumption that the curriculum and instructors responsible for delivery of ILE course content are dedicated life-long learners. The assumption is that the instructors and the curriculum are or can be as dynamic and flexible as the field Army's operational environment and the students for which they are responsible. In other words, the instructors whose instincts and examples are largely tied to outdated Cold War tactics and strategy (the old ideas) can recognize the need for change and embrace new ideas.

Military Support to Security, Stability, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) is defined as DOD activities that support U.S. government plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction, and transition operations. These functions are necessary to establish and sustain peace while simultaneously advancing U.S. interests. Initial guidance has been codified in DOD Directive 3000.05, 28 November 2005, "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations." This document, "establishes DOD policy and assigns responsibilities within the DOD for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations" (DOD Directive 3000.05 28 November 2005).

This studies third and final assumption is that the examination and study of stability operations will continue to gain momentum and grow within the U.S. joint, interagency, and defense communities as well as outside civilian schools and international government systems.

Definition of Terms

Advanced Operations Warfighting Course (AOWC): The field grade-credentialing course for OPCF officers. The AOWC develops OPCF officers with a warfighting focus for battalion and brigade command capable of conducting FSO in joint, multinational, and interagency environments with the requisite competencies to serve successfully as division through echelon above Corps staff officers.

Army Pentathlete: A multi-skilled leader who is able to rapidly transition between complex tasks with relative ease: specifically a leader who is a:

1. Strategic and creative thinker
2. Builder of leaders and teams
3. Competent full spectrum warfighter or accomplished professional who supports the soldier
4. Skilled in governance, statesmanship, and diplomacy
5. Understands cultural context and works effectively across it

Career Field: Includes career program positions of professional, administrative, and functionally related clerical and technical positions, which are grouped together for lifecycle management purposes.

Common Core: The combination of common military tasks, common leader, and directed or mandated tasks for specific courses, grade levels, or organizational levels regardless of branch or CMF or program.

Common Core Course Curriculum: The common course all Army major's attend as part of their intermediate level education. The common core prepares field grade

officers with a warrior ethos and warfighting focus for leadership positions in Army, joint, multinational and interagency organizations executing full spectrum operations.

Competency: A measurable pattern of knowledge, abilities, skills, and other characteristics that an individual needs in order to perform work roles or occupational functions successfully.

Contribute to: To be an important factor in; help to cause.

Curriculum: The aggregate of courses of study given in a school, college, university, and others.

Development: the act or process of developing; growth; progress.

Education: Instruction with increased knowledge, skill, and or experience as the desired outcome for the student. This is in contrast to training, where a task or performance basis is used and specific conditions and standards are used to assess individual and unit competency.

Enabling Learning Objective: Are the prerequisite skills required to master the Terminal Learning Objective. They are subtopics identified in the *topic analysis* step, phase I, of the Accountable Instructional System.

Field Manual Interim (FMI): To fill an immediate doctrinal gap, an interim FM is a Department of the Army publication expedited to the field without placing it through the standard doctrine development process.

Full Spectrum Operations (FSO): The Army's operational concept. Operations conducted overseas simultaneously combine three components: offensive, defensive, and stability operations. Within the United States, operations simultaneously combine offensive, defensive, and civil support operations.

Leader Development: The deliberate, continuous, sequential and progressive process, grounded in Army values that grows Soldiers and civilians into competent and confident leaders capable of decisive action. Leader development is achieved through the life-long synthesis of the knowledge, skills, and experiences gained through the developmental domains of institutional training and education, operational assignments, and self-development.

Nation-Building: The deliberate effort of a foreign power to construct or install the institutions of a national government, according to a model that may be more familiar to the foreign power but is often considered foreign and even destabilizing. Nation-building is typically characterized by massive investment, military occupation, transitional government, and the use of propaganda to communicate governmental policy.

Peace-Building: Stability actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

Stability Operations: An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.

Terminal Learning Objective: Contain the major tasks the student must achieve to demonstrate mastery of the course. The terminal learning objectives are the major topics identified in the *topic analysis*. Adding an action verb to the terminal learning objective standards provides the action / task statement for the supporting enabling learning

objectives. The learning level of the terminal learning objective is always equal to or at a higher level than the enabling learning objective.

Limitations

The first limitation of this research will be information. Not necessarily the availability of information concerning stability operations, but the management of what information to include in the study and what information will not be considered.

Stability doctrine and practices have been refined over the past few years. DOD and Department of State are currently developing policy and offices to address shortfalls in the military services' ability to perform stability operations. While there is a great deal of information, not all of it is fully developed, synchronized or shares common definitions. Given the continued dynamics of the Contemporary Operating Environment (COE) and national level policy, the cut off date for data collection in this thesis will be 30 October 2007.

A second limitation will be Army and Joint doctrine still under development. As an example, the current FM 3-0, *Operations*, dated June 2001, is currently under development and staffing as FM 3-0, *Full Spectrum Operations*. As such, the research may prove difficult to establish an approved objective baseline against which to measure the school's adequacy in presenting the subject. It is promising that this capstone doctrine, in particular, FM 3-0, will be approved by the time this thesis is accepted. Should that assumption prove wrong, all references to the use of doctrine not approved for implementation would carry that caveat.

Delimitations

This study will examine the curriculum content for stability operations as presented for AY 2006-2007. Specifically, the analysis of curriculum content will concern itself with a critical examination of the two 5-month programs that all OPCF officers receive at CGSS. Those two components are the common core course and AOWC described earlier in this chapter. In addition to the common core course and AOWC, three parallel blocks of instruction are integrated into the annual schedule. They are: History, Leadership, and Force Management.

As all three parallel blocks are presented concurrently in the common core course, it would seem logical to include the topic of stability operations within these parallels to synthesize understanding of stability operations as learning objective for the common core course.

The history and leadership blocks continue from common core course to AOWC. As a result, the examination and analysis of curriculum for stability operations will include all parallel blocks of instruction. Also, additional blocks of instruction are conducted during AOWC. These are the Joint Advanced Warfighter Course (JAWS) and the Special Forces (SOF) Track program. The JAWS course will be analyzed as a part of this study because it is managed and programmed as a part of AOWC. While JAWS attendance is restricted and does not include all Army majors, some stability operations curriculum is evident in JAWS and bears complete investigation. The SOF track is not managed as a part of the AOWC and therefore is not part of this study.

This study will not investigate the offerings or content of the Advanced Application Program (AAP) presented during the academic year nor describe or evaluate

the manner of employment of faculty in fulfilling stability operations requirements. The study also will not address any faculty development matters or issues concerning the Experiential Learning Model and its effect on content presentation as it relates to stability operations.

Further, the study will not address how the school determines subjects and topics for inclusion in curriculum. The curriculum development process is too detailed and the time available to complete this particular study is not sufficient to address this variable or its influence on final curriculum content.

Significance of Study

It is now widely acknowledged that the end of our 40-year standoff with the Soviet Union ignited many national and regional conflicts where American interests are threatened. Traditional political, diplomatic, and military means cannot manage this new global environment of instability. The problem goes well beyond that paradigm and a fresh approach is drastically needed.

The Army's contribution to the national security of the United States, and its vital interests, is sustained landpower. Landpower is, "the ability by threat, force, or occupation to promptly gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people. Landpower includes the ability to establish and maintain a stable environment that sets the conditions for a lasting peace" (FM 1 2005, 1-1). Based on that definition, it is the awareness and keen appreciation for the difficulty and understanding of stability operations, through the U.S. Army's ILE system, that makes this study significant.

In late 2005, stability operations emerged as a mission area for the DOD, the U.S. Government, our multinational partners, international organizations, and non-

governmental organizations. In that light, this study has implications Army and DOD wide. The Defense Department defines stability operations in DOD Directive 3000.05, *Military Support for Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations*, as: “Military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish and maintain order in States and regions” (2005, 2). Since this definition includes civilian activities, this thesis also has implications for the State Department, primarily the United States Agency for International Development, and very likely for the Commerce and Treasury Departments as stability operations include critical economic and infrastructure issues.

This first chapter proposes a need for additional curriculum addressing stability operations in the common core course and AOWC for two reasons. First, the U.S. Army will continue to conduct stability operations overseas as part of the prosecution of the Global War on Terror and promulgation of the 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States. Second, the content, quality, and emphasis on stability operations curriculum will play a critical role in the education and leader development of Army officers who will lead and execute those strategies. It is these officers, who are now, and will be in the future, be responsible for stabilizing failed regions of the world, protecting the vital interests of the United States, and securing a lasting peace.

The United States will continue to quickly win future ground wars. Potential adversaries know this and will avoid a toe-to-toe fight in open terrain. Future operations will therefore take place in an urban environment and consist of a complex mix of near-simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability missions. It should be equally clear that, the destruction of an enemy and its means to conduct war is only one part of a larger

complex strategic process. It is the successful creation of democracies, the construct of secure economies and the building or reconstruction of physical infrastructures that bring missions and campaigns to successful closure. These vital stability operations will deliver that elusive lasting peace and strategic victory.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

We have spent the last 50 years remembering and forgetting the importance of cultural awareness and stability operations. Now it's coming to us full force.

General David Petraeus
Multi National Forces-Iraq Commander

The U.S. Army has several core competencies in which it excels. In maneuvering swiftly and decisively in large operational formations, destroying an enemy while taking control of the land, it has no current peer. The reason for this is straightforward. The U.S. Army, historically, has spent the vast majority of its time in study and practice of operational movement and maneuver. The employment and sustainment of multiple division level formations is where the Army is at its best. Twentieth-century, open terrain warfare, is what the Army force is organized, equipped, trained, and educated to accomplish. That model was sufficient until the fall of Baghdad and the end of so-called "major combat operations." Over the summer of 2003, the U.S. Army began to relearn the art and tactics of simultaneous urban combat, providing civil security, governance and reconstruction; a true application of FSO.

The current body of literature on stability operations is more than sufficient for the purposes of this study and the literature continues to grow. The subject has gained considerable attention over the past few years for two reasons. First, the extreme difficulties the U.S. Army has faced conducting stability operations in Iraq since May of 2003 is well documented. There are numerous works, describing the complexity of the volatile situation the Army has created for itself in Iraq. Most of the literature offers

historical perspectives, describes current problems and makes recommendations. All of the works recognize that initiating, acceptance, and implementation of some changes will take years. Second, the publication of DOD Directive 3500.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, in November 2005. This directive announced policy that “stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the DOD shall be prepared to conduct and support” (DOD Directive 3500.05 2005, 2). This directive calls for sweeping initiative across several government agencies and all military services and has spawned numerous studies, conferences, articles and published research.

This chapter has six sections. The first section discusses the U.S. Army’s approach to stability operations in relevant capstone and tier one doctrine. The remaining five sections discuss literature as it relates to each of the stability tasks described in Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Full Spectrum Operations*.

Stability Operations in Army Doctrine

U.S. Army capstone doctrine provides broad guidance and direction for the conduct of operations and warfighting functions the Army performs. These functions are the fundamental tasks the Army executes to fulfill its role as the landpower component of a joint force. These primary tasks range from intelligence, operations and logistics to planning, command and training. Throughout ILE common core course and AOWC curriculum, use of these foundational publications is prevalent. Stability operations discussions occurred most often in doctrine concerning intelligence, operations, and planning.

The FM 2-0 describes the Army warfighting function of intelligence. Intelligence support to Army commanders in stability operations is similar to that provided in offensive and defensive operations--intelligence describes the operational environment in the context of the current mission. However, the manual illustrates the roles and fundamentals of intelligence in large measure through traditional lethal examples. The manual does describe key factors of stability operations such as, the nature and stability of the state, economics, demographics, and physical environment. Unfortunately, there is no guidance on which part of those factors to concentrate effort on.

Stability operations, “provide a secure environment, meet the critical needs of the populace and develop local capacity for security, economy, and rule of law (FM 3-0 2006, 3-7). The focus of these tasks is clearly on the population although; the chapter of FM 2-0 on Human Intelligence is (again) focused on mostly lethal, force-on-force descriptions. As an example, the roles and target of Human Intelligence concerns itself with order of battle, adversary decision-making with the intent of “shaping Blue’s visualization of Red” (FM 2-0 2004, 6-1). Wider discussion of how best to influence and gain information on the threat, politics, infrastructure, health status, and culture would be more helpful in a stability operation. The manual only mentions that doing those tasks incorrectly “may offend or cause mistrust among the local population” (FM 2-0 2004, 3-3).

Still under final review, this research uses the November 2006, DRAG edition of FM 3-0, *Full Spectrum Operations*. Although widely used and cited, the manual has not been authenticated and is not yet approved doctrine. In this study, the author will be

mindful to refer to all information or concepts from this DRAG edition as “under final review.”

FM 3-0, *Full Spectrum Operations*, as it has been in development over the past two years, pays a good deal of attention to the subject of stability operations throughout but in particular, chapter three. This new found emphasis is warranted as stability operations now represents one-third of the Army’s doctrinal mission focus for operations conducted overseas. At a briefing presented to the students, staff and faculty of CGSS, Mr. Clinton Ancker, the Director of the Combined Arms Doctrine Division, described the stability operations portion of chapter three as, “the single biggest change in the new manual” (Ancker August 2006).

Army operations overseas are ultimately responsible for establishing a lasting and stable peace. FM 3-0 provides valuable information and insight in how stability operations are conceptually undertaken and provide measures of effectiveness for each stability task in the form of lines of effort. As a part of operational approach, the stability mechanisms of compel, control, influence, and support are cited as a part of Operational Art (FM 3-0 2006, 6-10).

In its introduction, the manual proclaims, “Within the context of the war on terrorism, stability operations will often be as important as--or more important than--offensive and defensive operations” (FM 3-0 2006, ix). Thus, a stability operation potentially becomes the decisive point in reaching a successful end-state.

Army FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, is a Tier 1 (principle) manual published in February 2003. This publication details characteristics of stability operations conceptually and explains planning considerations pertinent for

successful stability operations. The manual's aim is to provide an understanding of stability operations, not the details of such an undertaking.

With the anticipated final approval of FM 3-0, *Full Spectrum Operations*, FM 3-07 will become obsolete and de-linked to the approved capstone doctrine. Anticipating this, in March of 2007, the Combined Arms Doctrine Division at Fort Leavenworth began work to update FM 3-07. The manual will be renamed "Stability Operations."

Although these doctrinal changes are substantial, these facts do not necessarily make FM 3-07 completely dysfunctional. The current version of the manual includes very useful and timely information in appendices on interagency coordination, negotiations, and refugees and displaced persons. This information is useful now in planning the five new types of stability operations: civil security, civil control, providing essential services, governance and economic development.

Published in December of 2006, as Army FM 3-24 and Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, filled a 20-year doctrinal chasm. This manual is the result of over two years of work that began with the issue of FMI 3-07.22, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, in October 2004. "The impetus for this FMI came from the Iraq insurgency and the realization that engagements in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) would likely use counterinsurgency TTPs" (FMI 3-07.22 2004, vi.). This FMI reviewed what the Army knew about counterinsurgency and explained the fundamentals of military operations in a counterinsurgency environment. The resulting FM 3-24 fully incorporates the lessons thus far from Iraq and Afghanistan.

Figure 1, Aspects of counterinsurgency operations, below demonstrates that a counterinsurgency is a “mix of offensive, defensive and stability operations” (FM 3-24 2006, i). Thus, all three elements of FSO are a part of counterinsurgency warfare.




Figure 1. Aspects of Counterinsurgency Operations

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: GPO, 2006).

The part of a counterinsurgency operation that dominates a given campaign is the product of numerous variables by location and echelon of command. What is important about figure 1 is that it clearly illustrates that stability operations will mature and become the dominate aspect of a counterinsurgency.

FM 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders Production*, explains planning and orders production and promotes a common understanding of those fundamentals. It is the “common reference for planning within the Army education system” (2005, V). The

manual provides a doctrinal approach to decision making that helps commanders and their staffs examine a situation, reach logical conclusions, and make informed decisions.

FM 5-0 applies to all aspects of FSO and thus has direct application to stability operations. The manual does not provide detailed guidance on tactical missions or the use of force, but focuses primarily on general application of the procedures described within it. Nearly all of the examples are for traditional offensive and defensive operations. The manual professes that planning for stability operations is similar in manner to that for offense and defense operations; however, it is the application of combat power that is different.

FM 5-0 states, “In missions characterized by stability operations, staffs often determine relative combat power by comparing available resources to the tasks assigned--troop to task analysis. In such operations, the functions of maneuver, non-lethal fires, leadership, and information may predominate” (2005, 3-33). This statement may be vital to identifying additional educational shortfalls and a need to increase instruction on the function of information operations as a part of stability operations in ILE. Ironically, those officers designated as Information Operations officers, Functional Area 30 (FA 30), are classified as non-operational career field officers and in general do not attend the common core course or the AOWC at Fort Leavenworth.

As a non-operational officer, Information Operations officers attend the common core course at a satellite campus. Those officers then attend their Functional Area 30 credentialing course. The impact is the Information Operations planning expertise required to strengthen and support all lines of effort for stability operations in

counterinsurgency, is not a part of the operational body of knowledge for the common core course or AOWC student staff groups at Fort Leavenworth.

The last review of Army doctrine is FM 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*, published August 2003. In the broad spectrum of Command and Control (C2), along with the processes and systems that support mission command, two areas stand out concerning stability operations: the human element and the principle of unity of effort.

The human element is essential in stability operations because of the required cultural intimacy and patience necessary to be successful in protracted operations. The manual stresses the importance of persuasion over destruction in C2 of a stability operation and acknowledges that the environment can be as complex and as deadly as traditional offensive and defensive operations (FM 6-0 2003, 1-19).

FM 6-0 states, “Achieving unity of effort in a stability operations environment is difficult but essential. A clear commander’s intent that lower-level leaders can understand is essential to maintaining unity of effort” (2003, 1-19). Unity of effort is also a fundamental theme found in FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*. Thus, communication of intent plays a considerable role towards unity of effort among the many participants found in most stability operations. And, in a much broader sense, shared understanding of a commander’s guidance and intent, as a part of information operations, is a critical element of stability operations.

The second part of this chapter contains five sections discussing relevant stability operations literature as it relates to each of the stability tasks. All literature reviewed was available in the Combined Arms Research Library at CGSC, on the Internet, or was

privately purchased. The U.S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth provided additional resources.

Research on Fort Leavenworth in 2006 produced over two dozens works concerning stability operations. Military Review articles, Occasional Papers published by the Combined Studies Institute, School of Advance Military Science (SAMS) monographs, and Master of Military Arts and Science (MMAS) account for most of these.

Beyond Fort Leavenworth, there are numerous U.S. government publications, non-governmental studies, conferences notes, and findings published on the subject of stability operations. Contributions have been made by organizations such as the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, United States Institute for Peace, The Congressional Research Service, Brookings Institute, RAND, and The Heritage Foundation to name a few. Lastly, books such as *Fiasco*, *Dark Victory*, *My Year in Iraq*, and *Cobra II*, all contain strong themes and hard testimony critical of the U.S. Army's un-preparedness concerning stability operations.

Among similar service colleges, The U.S. Naval War College and The U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College offer lessons and elective courses concerning stability operations, reconstruction and economics, rule of law, justice and reconciliation, and advising indigenous security forces. The U.S. Air Forces' Air Command and Staff College offers a course in planning considerations for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR), plus two additional courses on irregular warfare. Finally, while not an intermediate Service College per say, the Naval Post Graduate Center in

Monterey, California has established the Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies which offers a Masters Degree in Stabilization and Reconstruction.

Civil Security

Security is a core task for the U.S. Army. The term “secure,” in the context of Army operations, is security of a unit, facility or location and “involves preventing the enemy from damaging or destroying a unit, facility or geographic location” (FM 7-15 2003, 8-33). In the context of stability operations civil security “involves protecting the populace from external and internal threats” (FM 3-0, DRAG 2006, 3-13).

Several works address the issue of civil security. *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1942-1976*, by Andrew J. Birtle, provides historical perspective to U.S. Army involvement in stability operations. Probably the most popular book on the issue of international security and stability is Thomas Barnett’s, *The Pentagons New Map: Managing War and Peace in the 21st Century*. Other sources include Congressional Research Service (CRS) publications, *Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of Military Involvement*, by Nina M. Serafino and *Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy*, by Kenneth Katzman.

The findings from the sources listed above confirm that the primary objective of civil security is protection of the public. Military assistance programs, state or local police, a judicial system (rule of law), and prison systems constitute the essential organizations needed to achieve a recognized level of civil security. Another common theme was, in order for the other components of stability operations to take hold, grow and endure, civil security was paramount. What the sources did not fully develop were workable methods of transition of civil security responsibilities from military to civilian

organizations during stability operations; only that transition at some time in the future (based on certain conditions being met) was needed. One reason for this may be the specifics of transitions for many civil security areas, as they apply to Afghanistan and Iraq, are still ongoing and judgments of success or failure are on hold. The most widely cited examples of successful transitions were U.S. efforts following World War II in Germany and Japan. On the heels of such praise was equal commentary on the vast differences in transition practices today in Iraq and Afghanistan due to the history, culture, ethnic, tribal, and religious dichotomy found in both countries.

Civil Control

Closely related to civil security is the task of civil control. Civil Control is, “regulating the behavior and activity of individuals and groups” (FM 3-0 2006, 3-12). The focus of civil control tasks in stability operations is protection of the population from internal threats. A metropolitan police force generally has this task. As such, a trained and respected police force is the arm of most civil administrations responsible for enforcing laws which provide recognized control.

Three works point to three common challenges for the U.S. Army with regard to civil control in stability operations. The article, “Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations,” from *Military Review* by Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster, British Army, and two studies from the Defense Science Board (DSB), “*Institutionalizing Stability Operations within DoD*” and “*Transition to and from Hostilities*,” make these arguments.

First, the difficulty of transition for a force trained in combat to a force responsible for security and control of a civilian population. This point is made

repeatedly not only in regard to providing security and control but the immense difficulty of transition to all the stability tasks. Second, the lack of sufficient numbers of trained military police units to conduct civil control tasks. The mismatch of needed skill sets for stability operations compared to what the U.S. Army generally has available on the ground during transition is well documented. There is great deliberation taking place on current U.S. Army force structure and how best to evolve the current Army force to provide for stability operations without losing its warfighting edge or capability. Last, the lack of cultural understanding in interacting with indigenous populations. This final theme was largely true of units and guidance early in the Iraq stability campaign. Quick changes to training and education programs for cultural awareness have helped close this gap.

Beyond the general recommendations for the U.S. Army (and the other services) to reshape and balance their forces more towards control and security tasks, these works were mostly judgmental in nature. This is not difficult to do considering the force (so severely critiqued) was never trained or configured to undertake stability operations.

Restore Essential Services

Writings on U.S. Army responsibilities for essential services generally followed a pattern of assess, provide, support and build. The Army's role in this task would decrease over time to where the "build" phase to provide essential services was the responsibility of local government and civilians. "*Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*," edited by Hans Binnendijk and Stuart E. Johnson, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, and the article, "Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full

Spectrum Operations.” from *Military Review* by Major General Peter W. Chiarelli and Major Patrick Michaelis provide the most influential thoughts on this topic.

Essential services consist of potable water, sewage treatment, trash collection, electric power, transportation, schools, and medical services. The following findings were common in the previous cited material.

First, restoration of basic services is essential to a populations return to normalcy. Of all the services, electricity is the vital backbone upon which all the others services ride. A population that has its power restored has a recognizable and quickly internalized message that life is returning to normal.

Second, early success in security and jobs, in addition to power, is essential in any post conflict setting. Where water and energy services are interrupted, daily life for the inhabitants quickly becomes intolerable (Binnendijk 2004, 27). This interruption makes progress towards the other stability tasks extremely difficult.

This leads to the last point; the acquired skill of planning and simultaneous management of all lines of stability. A secure environment is the foundation upon which the other tasks are built. The simultaneous and properly integrated application of control, services, governance and economic development enable the attainment of stability. FM 3-24 summed it best--“When the populace perceives that the environment is safe enough to leave families at home, workers will seek employment or conduct public economic activity. Popular participation in civil and economic life facilitates further provision of essential services and development of greater economic activity” (2006, 5-6).

Support to Governance

The requirement to successfully establish a recognized form of government following conflict or intervention of a failed state is well documented. Efforts following World War II in Germany and Japan by the United States are the most representative in literature. Most current research concerns the lessons of Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

Important literature reviewed included the book *My Year in Iraq*, by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer; SAMS monograph “Occupation and Governance: The New Face of Operational Art” by Major Gregory L. Rhoden, U.S. Army, and *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*, edited by Hans Binnendijk and Stuart E. Johnson.

A central theme in governance planning was: minus any prearranged accord, the U.S. military will need to assume the governance role immediately upon the end of combat operations. Nearly simultaneous with that requirement will be establishment of a defined level of security to enable rapid, pre-planned involvement of other U.S. government agencies and the international community to provide economic assistance.

Secondary themes in governance involved the probability of having to educate those indigenous participants in the governance process of what a democracy is and how it functions. A challenge in this area was teaching political interdependence and consensus (non-violent, participatory processes) to a culture that has only known dictatorship or corrupt monarchies. The overall development of governance generally started at the local level and then grew to district, regional and finally national levels of

competency. Provisional Reconstruction Teams or Governance Support Teams assists nearly all of these efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq today.

Probably the most important school of thought running through transition and governance literature is the lesson of time. All major works reviewed point to a window of opportunity that existed in the spring and summer of 2003 in Baghdad. That opportunity, for the U.S. government to provide a safe environment, create employment, and begin facilitation of civil and economic life, closed around November of 2003 with nearly crippling effects. The lesson is clear: have a robust stability operations plan that outlines priorities with short, medium and long term objectives and ensure unity of effort amongst the military, interagency and international participants.

Support Economic and Infrastructure Development

The most useful research for economic and infrastructure development were from, *My Year in Iraq, Fiasco*, by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, MMAS thesis, “Structuring Economic Power for Stability Operations,” by Major Andrew t. Wallen, U.S. Air Force and SAMS monograph, “Bridging the Gap between Instability and Order: Establishing a Constabulary Capability in the Department of Defense for 21st Century Stability and Reconstruction Operations,” by Major Antonio V. Munera IV, U.S. Army.

The trends in economic development centered around three points: first, assessment of a countries economic strengths and weaknesses. Second (based on analysis of assessment) the agreed steps and decisions required to create, improve or otherwise “jump-start” a failing economy. Paramount to creating or improving a failed economy was international support, in particular support from border countries. Last, was to monitor and report results of efforts based on sound financial criteria.

Closely related to the improvement of economies was support to infrastructure. The examples and suggestions found in current literature followed an identifiable triage model of assess, repair or build. Protection of vital infrastructure (before, during and after combat operations) was a significant planning theme along with protection of historical sites. A recurring example of the interdependency of the stability tasks (in this case tied to economics and commerce) was security, repair and maintenance of Iraqi oil facilities (Crane 2003, 52).

Lastly, infrastructure assessment and repair is critical in getting essential services up and running quickly along with assessment of highways, bridges, tunnels, mass transportation, and power generation (line of communications) which are literally the “road” to success for all other stability tasks.

President John F. Kennedy noted, “You [military professionals] must know something about strategy and tactics and . . . logistics, but also economics and politics and diplomacy and history. You must know everything you can know about military power, and you must also understand the limits of military power. You must understand that few of the important problems of our time have . . . been finally solved by military power alone” (As quoted in FM 3-24 2006, 2-14).

Perhaps nowhere is this kind of insight more relevant than in the study and of stability operations. Its importance in Army intermediate level education, at this point in history, cannot be overstated. CGSS has a reputation for its ability to educate on strategy, tactics, logistics and history. If the school is to contribute to the Army’s goal of developing leaders who are competent in stability operations, now is the time to develop

and deliver curriculum in the critical areas of: control and security in urban settings, providing essential services, governance, and macroeconomics.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

You may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life – but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men into the mud.

T.R. Fehrenbach
This Kind of War

The U.S. Army does more than fight wars. In fact, throughout its history, the Army has spent the majority of its time in operations other than major wars and campaigns. No where, is this more evident than in today's complex security environment. Army doctrine refers to operations in this environment as full spectrum to account for the wide range of responsibilities the Army today must undertake. While the Army has generally excelled in large-scale warfare, the duration of such undertakings is very short when compared to the post-conflict operations that historically follow. These operations are now called stability operations and include a variety of tasks such as restoring essential services, governance and economic development. As such, this study asserts CGSS needs to enhance its curriculum content for stability operations in order to contribute to the Army's goal of developing leaders who are competent in stability operations.

This chapter explains how the research data is organized, analyzed and interpreted. This is a qualitative research paper. Qualitative data consists of words and observations also referred to as narrative data. In this study, the narrative data consists of the published works reviewed in chapter two and the CGSS curriculum, for AY 2006-

2007. As such, the method used is a combination of content and gap analysis needs as defined by the literature review and course content. Content analysis is a technique for gathering and analyzing the content of text. In the framework of this study, this reflects the analysis of the content of the curriculum for stability operations at CGSS. Gap analysis is a “formal means to identify and correct gaps between desired levels and actual levels of performance” (Parasuraman 34, 2004). This research compares stability operations as defined in FM 3-0, *Full Spectrum Operations*, and (DRAG Edition) November 2006, with CGSS curriculum content for stability operations presented during AY 06-07. Thus, CGSS curriculum reflecting stability operations as defined in FM 3-0, *Full Spectrum Operations* (DRAG Edition) November 2006, is the desired level of curriculum content. The research will reveal the actual level of stability operations content in CGSS curriculum. The difference between what is in CGSS curriculum and what is articulated in FM 3-0, *Full Spectrum Operations*, and (DRAG Edition) November 2006, is the gap. This methodology will reveal that gap, answer the research questions, and make recommendations on how best to fill that gap.

Prior to explanation of how the study progressed to answer the research questions, a brief description of the academic year and curricula organization are necessary.

The Army’s ILE, “consists of a common core curriculum and a required career field training and specialized education or qualification course” (AR 350-1 2006, 56). In providing that ILE, for programming purposes, the ten-month academic year at CGSS consists of two major courses and two AAP or “elective” periods. While not a part of this study, the AAP periods are described to provide a complete description of the school year. The officer student body is managed by “tracks” described later in this chapter.

The first course of the academic year is the common core curriculum, often referred to as ILE Core. All Army majors now receive this intermediate level education. The second half of the year is the AOWC. AOWC is the qualification course for operational career field majors. For the officers attending the course at Fort Leavenworth, this mid-career education is conducted as a single ten-month course. One reason for this is the use of a common planning scenario that stretches across the three levels of war during the ten-month year. The common planning scenario links the two courses.

Integrated with the common core course session are parallel blocks of instruction for leadership, history, and force management. The leadership and history blocks continue as parallel instruction during AOWC. During AOWC, two additional specialized tracks take place. A track is a program of instruction designation and is assigned to each student during in-processing. This is designed to broaden the officer's knowledge and provide an opportunity to study subjects in greater depth (CGSS Cir 350-5 2006, 15).

Track 1 officers are AOWC Operational Career field Officers. Operational Career Field Army majors in attendance at CGSS make up the vast majority of officers in this track. These officers attend all of AOWC as their qualification course. Track 2 officers are Special Operations Forces. These are all U.S. Army Special Forces branch officers, U.S. Army Civil Affairs Officers and U.S. Army PSYOP officers. Enrollment in the SOF track is mandatory for these officers. The third and final track (Track 3) is the Joint Advanced Warfighting Studies (JAWS). The JAWS program provides a comprehensive, intermediate level, joint education for a select group of officers (CGSS Cir 350-5 2006, 16).

Lastly, during AY 06-07, the two AAP periods are conducted between common core course and AOWC courses and again following AOWC up to graduation. Each AAP block is twelve weeks in length. The AAP provides students the opportunity to enhance personal and professional growth and supports long-term professional development (CGSS Cir 350-5 2006, 15). There are over 100 different subject offerings during the AAP sessions, examination of which is outside the scope of this study.

The first step in methodology for this study was to sort the content of the research into categories and themes. The two overarching categories of content for analysis in this research are the two major courses for the academic year at CGSS. The first category is the common core course and the second is the AOWC. The common core course and AOWC are further sub-divided each into smaller areas of curriculum content (themes) known as blocks, modules, and lessons.

Blocks and modules are the terms used by CGSS to describe and manage a particular course of study. A block is a specific manageable amount of curriculum consisting of several modules and lessons. A module is a sub-set of a block. A block of curriculum will consist of several modules. These modules contain the lessons, the last segment into which a course of study at CGSS is divided. The lessons thus form a single, continuous session of instruction supporting a module and block.

Eight blocks of instruction make up the common core course. These eight blocks are C100, *Foundations*; C200, *Strategic Studies*; C300, *Operational Studies*; C400, *Tactical Studies*; and the culminating event for the common core course, C999, the End of Core Course Exercise (EOCCE). Also during the common core course are the parallel

blocks of instruction for L100, *Leadership*, H100, *History*, and F100, *Force Management*.

The Advanced Operations and Warfighters Course (AOWC) consists of seven blocks: W100, *Warfighting at the Operational Level*; W200, *Warfighting at the Division Level*; and W300, *Brigade Combat Team*. The parallel blocks of H200 and 300, *History*, L200, *Leadership*, and JAWS complete the AOWC portion. In total for ILE common core course and AOWC there are 161 separate lessons, programmed into 15 modules and blocks of instruction.

This methodology will look for stability operations content in the lesson plans of the common core curriculum and AOWC curriculum for AY 2006-2007. The research will scan (using Word® Edit-Find tool) each lesson plan for nine key words: stability, civil security, civil control, essential services, governance, economic, infrastructure, transition, and reconstruction. These words are significant because they represent the five tasks for stability operations as described in FM 3-0, *Full Spectrum Operations* (DRAG Edition) November 2006.

When a key word is found in a lesson plan, that lesson plan will then be further analyzed to determine if the stability operations content of the lesson is significant. Significant in this research means those stability operations are a part of the learning objective in the lesson plan and, that the learning objective is assessed. Once the analysis of curriculum is complete, final determination will be made on whether the stability operations content found in CGSS curriculum contributes to the Army's goal of developing leaders who are competent in stability operations. To answer the primary research question; in the lessons where stability operations are identified as part of the

learning objective and assessed, those lessons will be counted as having made a contribution to the Army's goal of developing leaders who are competent in stability operations.

The primary research question remains--does the resident curriculum for Operations Career Field Officers, at the U.S. Army CGSS, contribute to the Army's goal of developing leaders who are competent in stability operations?

To answer the primary research question the following questions need to be answered:

1. What curriculum does the school currently present in stability operations?
 - a. Which blocks, modules or lessons mention stability operations as a part of the lesson plan?
 - b. Where in the lesson plan is stability mentioned?
 - c. Are stability operations a learning objective for the lessons in which they appear?
 - d. Is learning assessed where stability operations are a learning objective?
2. Are there shortfalls in the current stability operations curriculum when compared to the five types of stability operations tasks articulated in FM 3-0?
3. What should the ILE curriculum include regarding stability operations?

Before detailed explanation of how this methodology answers the research questions, a brief description of a lesson plan is needed. A lesson plan at CGSS consists of seven parts: scope, learning objectives, leader behaviors, readings, instructor additional reading, training aids, and an outline of the conduct of the lesson. The assessment plan for the lesson is articulated in an appendix to the block or module advance sheet.

To answer the first secondary research question, the following steps were taken to review all the lessons presented during the academic year. All curricula for the CGSS academic year were obtained in electronic format (Microsoft Word ®) from the CGSS academic portal Blackboard®. The curricula is organized and stored by the two major parts described previously as the common core course and AOWC. The curricula are then further cataloged into the different blocks, modules and lessons.

The entire lesson plan review and analysis process proceeded in the following manner. Each CGSS lesson plan for instruction is created, formatted and stored as a Word® document. Utilizing the Word® Edit-Find tool, the entire document was scanned for the nine key words described earlier. This process revealed which lessons mention stability operations.

To answer the question of where in the lesson plan stability is mentioned, the research method was designed to find key words in one of the seven parts of the lesson plan described earlier. Discovery of content through the Word® Edit-Find tool was tracked on a matrix (see Appendix A, Key Word-Lesson Tracker). This matrix lists the lessons that mention stability operations by lesson number, title and location in the lesson plan. This search will thus reveal which lesson plans specifically address stability operations as a part of the learning objective.

If a lesson plan is found to have stability operations as a part of a learning objective, the research will then examine the assessment portion of that lesson, module or block, to determine if the stability operations learning objective is assessed. If the learning objective is assessed, this is a significant finding. Significant findings will be

considered to contribute to the Army's goal of developing leaders who are competent in stability operations.

Determining what common core course or AOWC curriculum should include regarding stability operations will be a product two processes. First, the process of discovering what stability operations content is found in CGSS curriculum; in other words, the answers to question one, a through d. (presented on the matrix). Second, the difference between what was found in CGSS curriculum and how stability operations are as described in FM 3-0, *Full Spectrum Operations*?

To determine any shortfalls in the current curriculum when compared with FM 3-0 will be the results of question two and will generate recommendations for future stability operations curriculum.

This chapter has outlined the research method applied to the primary problem of determining if the resident curriculum at the U.S. Army CGSS contributes to the Army's goal of developing leaders who are competent in stability operations.

This is a qualitative methodology study. The techniques employed were a combination of content and gap analysis. The basic analysis focused on the content of the curriculum for stability operations at CGSS for AY 06-07 using FM 3-0, *Full Spectrum Operations*, as a baseline to determine shortfalls and provide recommendations to improve or increase the amount of stability operations content in the current CGSS curriculum. The presentation of the results of this methodology is presented in Chapter 4, *Analysis*.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

The Defense Science Board report on “Institutionalizing Stability Operations within the Department of Defense” was published in September 2005. As a response to recommendations made by the Defense Science Board in the aforementioned report, the Deputy Secretary of Defense signed DOD Directive 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR)” on 28 November 2005. On 7 December 2005, National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-44) was signed and the Department of State created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) (HQDA, ALARACT MSG 2006, 2).

As the Army continues to adapt to the realities it now faces in the 21st century, the 2006 Army Posture Statement calls for leaders who are more akin to a pentathlete--a leader who is able to “rapidly transition between complex tasks, within the full spectrum of operations.” The envisioned talents of this pentathlete are on a wide continuum from strategic and creative thinker, to a leader who is skilled in governance and diplomacy, to finally, a leader who is competent in FSO. FSO are, “the combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations in joint campaigns and operations conducted overseas” (FM 3-0, DRAG 2006).

One of several new responsibilities given to the Secretaries of the Military Departments by DOD Directive 3000.05 is to “ensure curricula in individual and unit training programs and service schools prepare personnel for stability operations” (DOD Directive 3000, 05 2005, 10). As such, this chapter presents the results of the research to

determine if CGSS curriculum helps to prepare Army majors for stability operations. Chapter 4 puts forward, interprets the evidence produced through the analysis, and presents what the study found to answer the primary and secondary research questions. The goal of this chapter is to communicate the depth of stability operations curriculum content presented in the common core course and AOWC and, determine if that curriculum contributes to the Army's goal of developing leaders who are competent in stability operations.

The methodology looked for stability operations content in the lesson plans of the Common Core curriculum and AOWC curriculum for AY 2006-2007. The research scanned (using Word® Edit-Find tool) each lesson plan for nine key words: stability, civil security, civil control, essential services, governance, economic, infrastructure, transition, and reconstruction. These words are significant because they represent the five tasks for stability operations as described in FM 3-0, *Full Spectrum Operations* (DRAG Edition) November 2006.

This chapter is organized to answer the research questions as presented in chapter 3. The presentation of the findings will articulate the number of lessons in which stability operations is mentioned (for the Common Core and AOWC) out of the total possible lessons for each of the two major courses in the academic year. The findings will next articulate exactly where and in which lesson plan a key word was found. This discovery is then interpreted as either being significant or not. A significant find means the key word(s) is a part of a lesson, module, or block learning objective and that learning objective is assessed for that block. These particular findings will be deemed as contributing to the development of Army leaders towards stability operations; however,

some allowances and conclusions will be drawn based on the type of assessment instrument used and whether or not all students are subject to the same instrument. Lastly, based on interpretation of the findings (what the data means relevant to the Army's goals for educating majors on stability operations) chapter five will suggest what stability operations curriculum should be included, in which blocks, and why. This final process will reveal the stability operations curriculum content shortfalls when compared to stability operations doctrine found in FM 3-0, *Full Spectrum Operations*, (DRAG Edition), November 2006. The outline of findings of the content analysis for AOWC will be as follows:

1. The blocks, modules and lessons in which a key word(s) appear.
2. Location in the lesson plans of the key word(s).
3. Lesson plans in which a key word(s) is part of the learning objective.
4. Lessons plans where the learning objective is assessed.

The Common Core Course

CGSS Circular 350-5, *Command and General Staff Officer Course*, describes the Common Core course as, “designed to establish a common officer culture grounded in leadership, Army full-spectrum warfighting in joint and multinational contexts, military history, and critical reasoning/critical thinking. The Common Core is the foundation for all field-grade officers” (CGSS Cir 350-6 2006, 6). The key phrase in this description is “Army full spectrum warfighting (FSO).” The Army conducts stability operations within the full spectrum construct. Stability operations can occur simultaneously with offense and defense operations to achieve desired mission or campaign effects. The Army's full spectrum construct is often referred to as “the three block war” during CGSS instruction.

This phrase comes from "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War" an article written for *Marines Magazine*, in January 1999, by General Charles C. Krulak, then the 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps (1995 to 1999).

Eight blocks of instruction make up the Common Core course. They are C100, *Foundations*; C200, *Strategic Studies*; C300, *Operational Studies*; and C400, *Tactical Studies*. The culminating event for the core course is C999, the EOCCE. Completing the Common Core curriculum are the parallel blocks of instruction for L100, *Leadership*; H100, *History*; and F100, *Force Management*.

The C100, *Foundations* block classes are "designed to make students more aware of contemporary environment and of self, to "set the stage" for learning during the rest of the course and beyond" (CGSS Cir 350-6 2006, 6). There are four modules in the foundations block which contain its thirteen lessons; they are *Critical Reasoning and Critical Thinking*, *Leader Assessment and Development*, *Media and the Military*, and *Culture and Military Operations*. C100 has six terminal learning objectives, they are: Identify with the relevant learning opportunities in CGSOC while organizing personal and professional values to appreciate the challenges of an evolving operational environment; Analyze the impact of threats, challenges, and opportunities in the international security environment; Reason critically; Explain leader development; Evaluate the military and media relationship, and Assess cultural considerations for every facet of military plans and operations. (C100 Block Advance Sheet 2006, 2-5).

Of the thirteen lessons presented during the C100 block, only four of them mention any of the key words. The greatest concentration of occurrences appears in the *Culture and Military Operations* module (three lessons) in which key words of stability

and reconstruction are found. These lessons highlight the importance of understanding the “human terrain” and weave together the critical aspects of cultural understanding in the context of counterinsurgency and stability operations.

The first lesson for the C100 block, “*International Security Environment, Operational Environment and Full Spectrum Operations*” contained the words stability and governance. All key words found in C100 were located in the “Conduct of the Lesson” section of the lesson plans. This portion of the lesson plan contains notes, practices and classroom procedures, which the lesson author provides to assist the instructors in the conduct of the class. Some of these notes may apply to a specific Power Point ® slide displayed during the lesson. Not all instructors use all slides or follow a lesson plan as published; so it is not possible to determine what learning towards stability operations may have occurred during those particular lessons. As none of the key words were part of a learning objective or assessment in the C100 block, these findings are not significant.

The C200, *Strategic Studies*, block “introduces students to the joint, multinational, and interagency environment and the doctrinal and theoretical concepts required to perceive, understand, and analyze strategic level military problems and challenges” (CGSS Cir 350-5 2006, 7). There are four modules in the strategic studies block which contain its nineteen lessons; they are *National Strategy Formulation, Department of Defense (DOD) Strategy Formulation, Strategic Capabilities, and Combatant Command Strategy Formulation*. C200 has three terminal learning objectives, they are: Formulate a strategic course of action; Analyze the linkage between national strategic policy and

guidance and outcomes at the tactical level of war, and Explain joint, interagency and intergovernmental forces and organizations (C200 Block Advance Sheet 2006, 2-4).

Of the nineteen lessons presented during the C200 block, ten contain key words. In eight of these ten lessons, all key words are located in the “Conduct of the Lesson” portion of the lesson plan. The greatest concentration of key word appearances of those eight lessons occurred in C204, *National Strategies: National Security Strategy (NSS) National Strategy for Victory in Iraq*. Unique to this lesson is the key word, “Economics.”

Discussion of economics is pervasive in C204 as a “means” (programs) to further the National Security Strategy of the United States. The lesson uses the November 2005 White House publication, “*National Strategy for Victory in Iraq*,” to illustrate this point using the “Economic Track” policy articulated in the White House publication. This track describes ways to reform Iraq’s economy as part of the struggle to stabilize the country. With economic growth, Iraq can build and increase capacity of various institutions to maintain infrastructures and rejoin the international economic community.

The next best concentration of key word occurrences is in C208, *Interagency Capabilities*. This is a short, one-hour lesson, but it is the first lesson in the Common Core in which students are exposed to stability and reconstruction. For homework, the students are directed to read before class “*Frequently Asked Questions*.” Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, found at <http://www.state.gov/s/crs/66427.htm>.

The learning objective of this lesson is for the student to gain a basic understanding of the capabilities of key interagency organizations. The students

accomplish this, in teams, representing various U.S. government agencies such as the Department of State, Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security. Their task is to work through a scenario in which the president of Cuba has died. The requirement is to provide to the National Security Council, their agency's perspective of the situation and the capabilities their particular agency can contribute. There is a single question, "Who plans stability and reconstruction operations?" the instructor is prompted to ask in the lesson plan guidance. The students, for C208, are assessed on their classroom participation as a part of the overall C200 block of instruction.

Again, not all instructors follow a lesson plan as written; so it is not possible to determine what learning towards stability and reconstruction operations took place based on the response to a single question that all C208 instructors may or may not have asked. As was the case for the C100 *Foundations* block; in C200, *Strategic Studies* block, none of the key words is part of a learning objective or assessed, so the findings of stability operations curriculum content for C200 are not significant.

The C300, *Operational Studies*, block "prepares officers to participate fully in joint operational planning efforts and to visualize and execute full spectrum operations at the theater / strategic and operational levels of war" (CGSS Cir 350-5 2006, 7). There are three modules in the operational studies block, which contain twenty-six lessons; they are *Joint Operations Doctrine*, *Operational Capabilities*, and *Joint Functions*. C300 has four terminal learning objectives, they are: Explain joint operational doctrine; Describe joint force capabilities and interagency, multinational, and legal considerations; Describe joint functions; and, Apply the military decision making process. (C300 Block Advance Sheet 2006, 3-6).

Of the twenty-six lessons presented during the C300 block, ten contain key words. In seven of these ten lessons, the key words appear only in the “Conduct of the Lesson” portion of the lesson plan. In the remaining three lessons plans, the first significant finding is located.

In the C301 lesson plan, the *Block Introduction and Overview*, the standard for the first block terminal learning objective, “explain joint operational doctrine,” is to describe “the types and range of military operations (includes Stability Operations)” (C301 Lesson Plan 2006, 2). A cross-reference of the student advance sheet for C301 and the C300 block advance sheet reveals the same learning objective; however, the key phrase “includes Stability Operations” is missing from both student advance sheets. In addition, there are no readings to support this learning objective in C301. Lastly, the take home exam in C308 does not assess this learning objective for all students.

C302C, *Major Operations and Campaigns*, represents the most comprehensive coverage of stability operations thus far in analysis of the Common Core course. Key words are located in the scope of the lesson, the standard for the lessons learning objective, student readings and in the conduct of the lesson portion of the lesson plan. The lesson scope states, “Given the importance of Stability Operations and the Stabilization Phase of Major Operations and Campaigns about half of the lesson is devoted to stability related doctrine and types of operations” (C302C Lesson Plan 2006, 1). There is also an in-class practical exercise. In the practical exercise, the students compare and contrast (among offensive, defensive, and stability operations) the various planning tasks of end state, enemy center of gravity, lines of operations, phases, and measures of effectiveness. This lesson plan contains recognizable instruction, student

reading, and in-class exercises for stability operations. Sadly, the C308, take-home exam, does not require the student to “describe stability operations,” which is the standard for the learning objective in C302C.

Also, while not as robust in stability content as C302C: C302D *Contingencies, Crisis Response and Support to Other Government Agencies (OGA)*, contains stability as a part of the lesson learning objective, but again, the C308, take-home exam, does not require the student to “describe stability operations,” which is also the standard for the learning objective in C302D.

For the block exam, C308, the student is a planner on a joint task force (JTF) confronted with a tsunami relief mission. The scenario-driven exam assesses the students’ understanding of the application of joint doctrine, joint capabilities, and joint functions. In particular, the exam assesses the student’s knowledge in describing what joint capabilities and functions to recommend to stabilize a disaster relief situation.

The scenario requires the student to broadly address some, but not all, stability tasks described in the November 2006, DRAG edition of FM 3-0, *Full Spectrum Operations*. The stability tasks that require the student’s attention are civil security and control, provision of essential services and infrastructure repair (development). The scenario does not involve requirements for governance or support to economic development. Overall, the C308 block exam broadly addresses some stability operations issues but falls short of directly assessing the student against the standard for the learning objectives found in C302C and C302D.

To summarize the findings in the C300 block, of the twenty-six lessons presented during the C300 block, ten contain key words. In seven of these ten lessons, the key

words appear only in the “Conduct of the Lesson” portion of the lesson plan. Just three lessons plans out of twenty-six have stability operations as a part of their learning objectives. The significance of these three lessons is the block assessment instrument fails to directly assess for this standard listed for the stability learning objectives.

The C400, *Tactical Studies*, block “examines the fundamentals of Army doctrine, tactical operations, and military problem solving models with each lesson providing instruction and activities designed to make students understand and appreciate their roles and responsibilities as field grade officers during the planning, preparation, and execution of full spectrum operations” (CGSS Cir 350-5 2006, 7). There are seven lessons in the tactical studies block. The module, *Fundamentals of Army Doctrine*, contains four of the seven lessons; they are *Full Spectrum Operations*, *The Enemy*, *Sustaining Army Operations* and *Commander’s Role in Command and Control (C2)*.

C400 has three terminal learning objectives, they are: Execute the Military Decision Making Process, Evaluate US Army doctrinal war fighting concepts and Analyze US Army tactical doctrine (C400 Block Advance Sheet 2006, 5-6). The last learning objective for the C400 block includes stability operations as a condition when students apply full spectrum operations. Of the seven lessons presented during the C400 block, four contain key words. Two of the findings are worth mentioning while the other two are significant. These will be discussed, but a comment towards scheduling is needed before that discussion.

The scheduling for the C400 block is unusual for AY 2006-2007. The lessons do not flow uninterrupted as do all the other blocks in the Common Core course. The C400 block lesson flow was fragmented over the first half of the year. CGSS AY 06-07

consisted of forty-four weeks. Lesson C411, *Introduction to the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP)*, was taught very early in the year, week two and three to be exact. The C411 lesson scope reads, “The skills developed in this lesson provide the foundation for the ILE course goal of educating field grade officers in the conduct of full spectrum operations.” The lesson scope concludes with, “The primary goal of this lesson is for students to improve their understanding and application of the MDMP to solve complex problems. They will apply the skills and knowledge they have learned from this lesson during numerous lessons and exercises throughout the remainder of ILE” (C411 Lesson Plan 2006, 1-2).

C431, *Full Spectrum Operations*, and C432, *The Enemy*, follow next in the schedule and occur during weeks eleven and twelve. Following the first six-week AAP and the two-week Winter Break, the C400 block concludes in weeks twenty-one through twenty-three with C433, *Sustaining Army Operations*, C441, *Fundamentals of Tactical Operations*, and C451 (*block exam*).

In C411, *Introduction to the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP)*, the instructor notes for the conduct of the lesson contain the key words stability, economic, infrastructure and transition. The lesson teaches the steps of the MDMP. An unexpected discovery occurred at this point (previously cited above) in the analysis; C411 is taught during the second and third weeks of the academic year. This timing is at the conclusion of the C100, *Foundations*, block and precedes the C200, *Strategic Studies*, block. This scheduling is very remarkable because the roles the students assume in C411 are staff members of a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) conducting mission analysis to plan for a post-war stability operation. This seems incredible because to this point--there has been

no post-war stability operations instruction! This scenario drives an in-class practical exercise and homework assignment. The students produce an individual course of action sketch and statement. This requirement is not graded.

Nine weeks after the completion of C411, C431, *Full Spectrum Operations*, is presented as the first lesson of the C430 module. The key words stability, essential services and reconstruction are found in the conduct of the lesson, student readings, and in the C400 Diagnostic exam.

The student readings for C431 are important for two reasons, their content and timing. The content of the readings is very good and include stabilization and reconstruction material from FM-1, *The Army*, FMI 5-0.1, *The Operations Process*, and the widely read Military Review article, “*Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full Spectrum Operations*,” by Major General Peter Chiarelli. The timing of the lesson however, is not optimal. C431 occurs nearly nine-weeks after C411 and a month after the last concentrated stability student readings, and instruction completed for C302C, *Major Operations and Campaigns*.

The C431 diagnostic exam is completed in class as part of the lessons’ concrete experience. The students have twenty-minutes to answer twenty-five questions concerning FSO, two of which relate to stability operations. The diagnostic exam is used to provide self-awareness to the students and situational understanding to the faculty of individual students and staff group strengths and weaknesses in FSO. The remainder of the C430 module lessons, *The Enemy*, *Sustaining Army Operations and Commander’s Role in Command and Control (C2)*, contain no mention of stability operations.

C441, *Fundamentals of Tactical Operations*, could be a significant lesson. The lesson uses Operations Cedar Fall and Junction City, which occurred in Vietnam in 1967, as the driver to instruct students on Army full spectrum operations at the Division and Corps levels. The learning objective for the lesson includes stability as a condition for the action “Analyze U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine” (C441 Lesson Plan 2006, 2). This objective is possibly assessed in the C451, *Block Exam* in two questions: E-4: Explain the considerations you made when transitioning from one type of operation to another (example: offense to defense to stability), and E-5: Of the ten types of stability operations, choose one that you could expect to conduct both during and after this (Cedar Fall and Junction City) operation. Define your selection and justify your choice of this particular type (C400 Exam 2006, 8). The research states “possibly assessed” because the student does not have to answer either one of the above questions on the exam. Explanation for this comes later in this section.

The content of the C441 lesson has the potential to be significant for stability operations. The reason is that when this lesson plan was assembled, the Army was (and still is as of this typing) in between approved stability operations doctrine concerning definitions and tasks. C431 and C441 employ a mix of old (approved) and new (not yet approved but widely used) stability operations doctrine. This is both good and bad news as some students could potentially walk away confused as to exactly what a stability operation is.

The ten-types of stability operations the student could choose to describe as part of the C451 *block exam* comes directly from the student led instruction on stability operations in C441, *Fundamentals of Tactical Operations*. While this is an assessment of

current approved doctrine for stability operations out of FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, these ten-types of stability operations will soon no longer fit the approved rubric of Army stability operations tasks. However, many implied tasks within some of the ten stability operations are closely related to the new stability operations tasks of control, security, restore essential services and infrastructure repair. The readings in both C431 and C441 for urban operations and, command and control, provide some relevant stability understanding. Closely related to stability operations in the readings are such matters as ASCOPE; a memory aid for the characteristics considered under civil considerations: areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events.

In summary, the C400, *Tactical Studies*, block has seven lessons, four of which mention stability operations, two of those, in a significant manner. C431, *Full Spectrum Operations*, and C441, *Fundamental of Tactical Operations*, employ a good mix of student readings, one diagnostic exam, and student led instruction on the subject of stability operations. However, the student can only be assessed for stability operations competency if he or she chooses to answer the stability operations questions, on the C451, *block exam*. Therefore, the findings for the C400 block are not significant.

The H100, *Transformation in the Shadow of Global Conflict* block, “explores transformation in the interwar period. The course starts with a short examination of the state of military art and science at the end of the Great War. Then, in succeeding lessons, traces the development of new technologies and doctrines from the perspective of major world players. Ultimately, students discover outcomes of these transformations in the cauldron of World War II battle” (H100 Block Advance Sheet 2006, 1). The history parallel starts in the third-week of the academic year and continues throughout the ten-

month academic year. H100 is a single block, presented in twelve lessons. The block has two terminal learning objectives; they are, “use historical context to inform professional military judgment and analyze the major factors that shaped military innovation and institutional transformation during the interwar period” (H100 Block Advance Sheet 2006, 1-2).

The key word stability appears twice in the block, once in the scope of H107, “*Blitzkrieg: Return to Decisive Warfare*” and again in the apply of H112, *Transformation in the U.S. Military: The Past as Prologue*. Nowhere in the entire block is any other key word located in any part of the twelve lessons plans. The key words are not part of any lesson learning objective nor assessed therefore, the findings in the H100 block are not significant.

The Goal of L100, *Leadership*, is, “to assist officers in developing an organizational level leadership perspective to effectively lead Army, Joint, Inter-agency and Multinational Organizations in full spectrum operations and meet the challenges of the contemporary operational environment” (L100 Block Advance Sheet 2006, 1). The leadership parallel also starts in the third-week of the academic year and continues throughout the ten-month academic year. L100 is also single block, presented in twelve lessons. The block has one terminal learning objective, it is, “Develop an organizational level leadership perspective” (L100 Block Advance Sheet 2006, 3).

The key word stability appears only once in the entire block and that is in a question (“Are these stressors different for combat operations and support and stability operations?”) found in the conduct of the lesson for L103, *The Psychological and Environmental Stresses on Soldiers and Leaders*. Just as in the H100, *History*, block,

nowhere in the entire L100, *Leadership*, block is any other key word located in any part of the twelve lessons plans. The key words are not part of any lesson learning objective nor assessed therefore, the findings in the L100 block not significant.

The last block of instruction analyzed for the core course is F100, *Force Management*. The Goal of F100 is to, “acquaint the student with the components of the Army Vision and the Army Campaign Plan; the issues, organizations, and processes an organization interfaces with to implement programmed change. The ultimate goal of this module is to develop officers who are better prepared to lead, manage, affect and implement organizational change (modularity/transformation) as a commander, XO, or S3” (F100 Block Advance Sheet 2006, 1). F100 consists of six lessons and a culminating exercise, all of which are conducted within the common core course. The block has one terminal learning objective, it is: “Analyze the Army change process” (F100 Block Advance Sheet 2006, 2).

The key word stability appears only once in the entire block and that is in the conduct of the lesson for F102, *The Army Campaign Plan and Modularity*. Just as in the *History* and *Leadership* parallels, nowhere in the entire F100, *Force Management*, block is any other key word located in any part of the six lessons plans. The key words are not part of any lesson-learning objective nor assessed therefore, the findings in the F100 block are not significant.

The culminating event for the common core course in AY 06-07 is C999, the EOCCE. The EOCCE is a 32-hour, JTF level-planning exercise comprised of vignettes that focus on strategic and operational level problems (C999 Advance Sheet 2006, 1). Throughout the three-day exercise the students conduct mission analysis and course of

action (COA) development for a United Nation Chapter VII, Peace Enforcement operation in the Nagorno-Karabakh (a de facto independent republic located in the South Caucasus, officially part of the Republic of Azerbaijan), to replace a current Chapter VI, Peacekeeping operation.

Concurrent with this planning, the aforementioned vignettes are injected during the exercise to cause separate, rough COAs to be developed for the JTF Commander (C999 Lesson Plan, Appendix K, Vignette Guide 2006, 1). There are eight different vignettes in the EOCCE for implementation. Instructors are directed to use only two of the eight vignettes to over the three-day exercise. One vignette is “Stability Operations--Refugee Camp Destabilization.”

This stability operations vignette describes destabilization in a refugee camp due to active recruitment of new members by local insurgents in the camp, non-governmental organizations unable to provide all needed medical care for the camp, and local aid workers fearing for their lives. The non-governmental organizations are asking for security and additional logistics support from the JTF Commander as well as for more doctors, nurses and medicines. This vignette loosely fits the stability operation “Humanitarian and Civic Assistance,” described fully in FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*.

The EOCCE is not significant towards assessing stability operations learning for four reasons. First, none of the six EOCCE learning objectives articulates a learning goal for stability operations. Second, only one key word appears (stability) and that is in the title of Vignette 3. Third, because application of the stability vignette is an option, it is not possible to determine how many teaching teams actually used the stability vignette or

what the assessed outcomes of the student briefings were. Fourth and final, not all students participate equally in-group presentations.

The Common Core Course--What Has Emerged

The Common Core course is designed to “establish a common officer culture grounded in leadership, Army full-spectrum warfighting in joint and multinational contexts, military history, and critical reasoning/critical thinking. The Common Core is the foundation for all field-grade officers” (CGSS Cir 350-5 2006, 6).

The goal of this first section was to make four determinations. First, what stability operations curriculum content exists in the Common Core? Second, determine where in the course the stability curriculum is located (which blocks, modules or lessons and where exactly in the supporting lessons plan). Third, determine if stability operations were a learning objective for the block, module or lesson, in which it was found. Fourth, determine if that learning objective was assessed.

Key words for stability operations appeared in thirty out of ninety-six lessons in the common core course. The matrix at appendix A articulates the details of these findings. Out of the thirty lesson plans which mention stability operations, in the common core course, potentially significant stability operations curriculum content appeared in only five, they were: C301, *C300 Operational Studies Introduction and Overview*, C302C, *Major Operations and Campaigns*; C302D, *Contingencies, Crisis Response, and Support to OGA's*; C431, *Full Spectrum Operations*, and C441 *Fundamentals of Tactical Operations*.

These lessons are significant to this research because they contain stability operations as a part of the lesson-learning objective and that objective was part of an

assessment instrument for that particular block. While that appears to be good news, further examination of the assessment instruments reveal that not all students are assessed on all tasks for stability operations, (as described in the November 2006 edition of FM 3-0, *Full Spectrum Operations*) or as described in FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*. Specific assessments, for all students, on restoring essential services, governance and, economic and infrastructure development, were not found.

For the C300 block, potentially significant curriculum content for stability operations is found in the following lessons: C301, *C300 Operational Studies Introduction and Overview*, C302C, *Major Operations and Campaigns*; C302D, *Contingencies, Crisis Response, and Support to OGA's*. The stability operations learning objectives for these lessons fall short of being fully assessed in the C308, *Joint Operational Planning Application*, COA Take Home Exam. The instructions for the exam state, “this exam is an open-book, take home exam intended to assess your understanding of the joint planning process, specifically the steps of mission analysis and COA development, and the application of joint doctrine, joint capabilities, and joint functions to those steps of the planning process” (C308 Take Home Exam 2006, 1).

The scenario for the exam is JTF level planning for a humanitarian disaster relief mission. The plan also calls for the defeat of an indigenous terrorist group. It is through the joint planning process, the application of doctrine and use of joint capabilities and functions that employ some, but not all, aspects of stability operations in the exam. The problem sets within in the exam requires the student to address such stability issues as civil security and control. The scenario also presents some reconstruction problems; these are not exactly the same as infrastructure development but the case can be argued either

way and is beyond the intent of this study. The exam weakly covers the stability tasks of restoring essential services and support to governance however, the exam does not address the stability task of support to economic and infrastructure development.

The stability operations learning objectives for the C400 block are potentially assessed in the C451, Army Operations, block exam. The instructions for the exam state, “This is your opportunity to receive a graded assessment of your tactical thought process as related to applying fundamental doctrinal concepts to a large tactical organization conducting full spectrum operations. Operations CEDAR FALLS and JUNCTION CITY comprise the scenario for the exam as presented during lesson C441, Fundamentals of Tactical Operations” (C451, Exam, Block C400: Army Operations 2006, 1). Again, while this appears to be good on the surface, the research has discovered that not all students are required to answer all of the questions concerning stability operations.

Specifically, in part two of the exam, sections A through E, the student is required to choose just one question to answer in a short essay fashion. Each section contains one to five questions. In section E, specifically, there are five questions from which to select. Two of those five questions address stability operations. Since a student can completely opt out of answering the questions on stability operations, not all students are assessed equally on the stability operations learning objectives for C400. Therefore, these findings are not significant even though the learning objective is linked to the assessment.

In the final analysis, the common core course purports to “establish a common officer culture grounded in leadership, Army full-spectrum warfighting” (CGSS Cir 350-6 2006, 6). Based on the evidence analyzed this was not found to be the case as none of

the learning objectives for stability operations are directly assessed in the common core course assessment instruments.

Coincidentally, stability operations are in fact a part of Army “full spectrum operations” (not full-spectrum warfighting). Although widely assumed to mean the same thing, the research could not find the phrase “full-spectrum warfighting” in Army doctrine and therefore use of the term “full-spectrum warfighting” is not doctrinally correct and should be corrected in future CGSS publications.

The Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course

The AOWC focuses on “a warfighting curriculum that addresses commandership, leadership, history, full-spectrum warfighting” (CGSC Cir 350-5 2006, 9). Here again, the phrase “full-spectrum warfighting” is doctrinally incorrect and interpreted to mean “full spectrum operations.”

The AOWC consists of sixty-five lessons programmed into seven blocks. Three of the blocks are the substance of the course and consist of W100, *Operational Warfighting*; W200, *Division Organization, Doctrine, and Full Spectrum Operations*; and W300, *Brigade Operations*. There are one leadership and two history parallel blocks during the AOWC and lastly, J300, the *Joint Advanced Warfighting Studies* or JAWS program, which begins for select officers at the completion of W200.

The W100, *Operational Warfighting*, block “focuses on echelons above division level, specifically the Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC), Army Service Component Commander (ASCC), Army Forces Commander, (ARFOR) and Corps level. The instruction examines the operations environment, operational logistics and personnel support, and Combined Joint Force Land Component Commander (C/JFLCC)

operations” (CGSC Cir 350-5 2006, 9). The block has five learning objectives, the most important for the purposes of this research being, “Analyze the planning and conduct of stability operations. The standards for analysis are: (1) Explanation of stability operations doctrine and key concepts, (2) Historic COIN operations analysis results and, (3) Explanation of stability (or stability and reconstruction) operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and other current operations” (W100 Block Advance Sheet 2006, 3). W115, *Counterinsurgency (COIN) Study Methodology and Framework and the Philippine Insurrection Case Study*; W116, *Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*; and W119, *Historical Case Study: The Soviets in Afghanistan 1979-1989*, address these standards.

The W100 block contains fifteen lessons, one of which is the twenty-four hour block practical exercise (assessment instrument). Of the fourteen instructional lessons, five lessons have stability operations included as a part of the lesson learning objective, four of these five lessons can be assessed in the block practical exercise, three of these lessons are significant in stability content and assessment possibilities, (see Appendix B, Key Word--Lesson Tracker for details). The research uses the phrase “assessment possibilities” because again, the research has unexpectedly discovered, not all students are being equally assessed on their competency for stability operations. The assessments are unequal because not all students participate equally in group work or presentations to instructors. The majority of assessed work for the W100 block is group work.

Seventy-percent of the students assessed grade for W100 is group work. Consequently, just 30 percent of the block grade is based on individual work. Of this individually assessed work, 20 percent is a running estimate and the remaining 10 percent is a classroom participation grade for all of W100. The student begins the running

estimate process in W114, *Staff Functions: Battle Rhythm, Estimates, and Running Estimate*. A running estimate is a continuous process. It is the product of all planning actions a staff performs for a particular function (for example Sustainment). The running estimate is updated throughout the MDMP and eventually is published as a part of the operations plan.

For the 20 percent running estimate grade, students select or are assigned to produce a running estimate from forty-five different operational and functional estimates. These estimates form the basis of various recommendations and decision making during the W199, *Concept Development Practical Exercise*, (block assessment instrument). The various running estimates are applied and assessed during Phase V Planning (Establish Security and Restore Essential Services) as a the W199 exercise. The application of the running estimates, for stability operations learning and competency for every student during W199, is not possible to determine.

Potentially forty-five estimates are produced within a staff section of approximately sixty-four students in W199 as a part of Phase V planning. Some students would not produce an estimate at all because they are filling a key leadership billet in the W199 exercise. Because of the very broad individual estimates being assembled (for planning towards a stability phase of the operations) it is impossible to determine how much competency in stability operations the individual officer gains during the block assessment exercise.

In summation, W100, *Operational Warfighting*, block has five learning objectives, the most important to this research is, “Analyze the planning and conduct of stability operations. The standards for analysis are: (1) Explanation of stability operations

doctrine and key concepts, (2) Historic COIN operations analysis results and, (3) Explanation of stability (or stability and reconstruction) operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and other current operations” (W100 Block Advance Sheet 2006, 3). While the W115, *Counterinsurgency (COIN) Study Methodology and Framework and the Philippine Insurrection Case Study*; W116, *Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*; and W119, *Historical Case Study: The Soviets in Afghanistan 1979-1989*, lessons address the block standards; however, the block assessment instrument does not assess against the above listed standards for all students equally. In other words, not all students are assessed against the published standards on their ability to explain stability operations doctrine, present historic COIN operations analysis or explain stability operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. Therefore, the findings for stability operations learning during W100 are not significant.

The W200 block: *Division Organization, Doctrine, and Full Spectrum Operations*, is designed to provide the student a “complete opportunity to understand full spectrum operations at the division level with respect to organization, employment, synchronization of capabilities and battle command” (W200 Block Advance Sheet December 2006, 1). There are four modules within the W200 block, one of which is the W299, *Division Operations Exercise*. The teaching modules are W201, *Division Concepts and Enablers*, W211, *Division Operations Fundamentals*, and W221, *Division Functional Staff Procedures*; there is also a block exam. These four modules contain the four main lessons and are managed for presentation in the form of appendices consisting of ten actual lessons plans. Of the ten actual lesson plans, eight contain stability content; however, again the research has found that not all students are assessed equally on the stability operations content or learning objectives.

The W200 block has one terminal learning objective, Evaluate division full spectrum operations, and four supporting enabling learning objectives. All of the learning objectives have as a condition “given readings as they apply to full spectrum missions – simultaneous offense, defense, stability, movement, and sustainment” (W200 Advance Sheet 2006, 4). The block assessment plan articulates that in W211, *Divisional Operational Fundamentals*, the student, individually, will produce a COA statement and sketch for an offense, defense or stability operation. This does not turn out to be the case. The details of the W211 individual assessment findings are discussed later in this section.

W201, *Division Concepts and Enablers*, is an eight-hour lesson that “introduces the U.S. Army doctrine for the division-level operations and emerging concepts of the Modular Force” (W201, Lesson Plan 2007, 1). The learning objective of the lesson is to “analyze division staff officer roles, responsibilities, and actions” (W201 Lesson Plan 2007, 2). A combination of instructor-led teaching and student practical exercises accomplish this objective. The lesson covers among other topics, the role of the division, explanation of the Stryker, Heavy and Infantry BCT, the three types of division command posts (CP), and duties and responsibilities of various staff positions within the division main CP G5 plans cell. This lesson has no graded requirements or products.

W211, *Division Operations Fundamentals*, is a twenty-hour lesson presented over five sessions. Three of the five sessions focus on the components of FSO; offense, defense, and stability operations and account for fifteen of the twenty hours. Specifically, session five of W211, is a four-hour session on stability operations.

The learning objective for W211 is to recommend a division course of action. The learning objective conditions include readings of division doctrinal concepts and

principles as they apply to full spectrum missions--simultaneous offense, defense, and stability operations and the learning objective standard includes critiquing the fundamentals of division-level operations including stability (W211 Lesson Plan 2006, 2). The student readings to prepare for this four-hour block are very good and include the *Military Review* article, "Phase IV Operations: Where Wars are Really Won," by Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Conrad C. Crane, and *The Accidental Statesman: General Petraeus and the City of Mosul, Iraq* case study, Harvard University.

The lesson plan slides and supporting instructor notes are especially good. They use a mix of approved and emerging doctrine to teach the types of stability operations along with their characteristics and planning considerations. The lesson also demonstrates for the students how to use the planning constructs of PMESII (political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure) and METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops available, time available, and civil considerations) to evaluate conditions in a stability operations environment. The in-class practical exercise breaks the staff group into three small groups to define the stability "enemies" in the GAAT (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey) planning scenario. The students use the PMESII and METT-TC constructs to organize their analysis.

The part of the assessment plan for W211 (as articulated in the student advance sheet) applicable to stability operations calls for the students to produce a division level COA statement and sketch for offense, defense or stability operations. Since the student can choose not to produce a stability operations COA statement and sketch, here again not all students are assessed against the learning objective for stability operations. Confusing the matter even further, in the instructors' lesson plan, the assessment plan

articulates that the students will produce COA statements and sketches for offense and defense operations only, none for stability.

W221, *Functional Staff Procedures--Military Decision Making Process (MDMP)*, is a twenty-eight hour lesson that applies large unit problem solving in a functional staff configuration at the division level. One of the lessons enabling learning objectives is to synchronize staff and battlefield activities. The standard for the learning objective is that the synchronization will include simultaneous offense/defense/stability operations (W221 Lesson Plan 2006, 1).

The students are organized as the G5 Plans Cell in the Division Main Command Post and assume the various planning functions of Command and Control, Intelligence, Force Application, Force Protection and Force Sustainment. This student G5 Plans Cell, completes the MDMP process and prepares estimates to better understand and communicate the requirements and capabilities needed to execute the mission to restore Azerbaijan territory, create a stable, secure environment and support humanitarian assistance (W221 Lesson Plan 2006, 1). Key tasks for the mission include establishing a defense in depth in support of future stability and reconstruction operations. Fundamental to mission end state is the divisions' ability to continue stability and reconstruction operations and to secure the civilian population (W221 Lesson Advance Sheet, Enclosure 5 2006, E5-1).

The assessment plan for W221 consists of four parts, two student group work efforts and two individual efforts. The student group efforts are the mission analysis and course of action decision briefings. The two individual assessments are the running

estimates relative to the students' assigned position in the G5 Plans Cell and formulating a friendly course of action statement and sketch.

While the assessments focus on the block-learning objective of developing a division full spectrum operational plan, they weakly assess stability operations competency for the following three reasons. First, the recurring problem of assessments for group work. All the student oars may appear to be in the water, but not all oarsmen row equally. In education, we know this to be true; a fair and accurate assessment of individual learning and competency, while working in a group, is difficult at best. The overall assumption is that the student "got it," but we really do not know to what degree any competency is gained. Second, the individual effort of producing the running estimate focuses on single planning functions (for example Personnel or Intelligence) as that function applies and supports the larger full spectrum plan. Finally, the individual COA statement and sketch would only present spotty assessment opportunity of stability operations learning. A doctrinally correct COA statement and sketch will include several items. Among them are the mission, intent, decisive, shaping and sustaining operations, fires, deception and risk. The stability operations portion of the COA statement and sketch may be minute, if there at all.

The W299 Division Operations Exercise is the application segment for the W200 block. During the seven-day lesson students use the skills they obtained during the previously discussed lessons. The exercise fulfills the learning objective to direct concurrent division full spectrum operations. This execution exercise is driven by the Caspian Challenge operations order and scripted mission injects which the students must then plan, brief, and execute. The flow of these injects includes analysis of intelligence

and operational summaries for insurgent activities, aid to refugees, preservation of infrastructure, and restoration of basic services. A key goal of the exercise is to balance the student planning efforts for offense, defense, stability, and reconstruction operations.

The student staff section is organized as a divisional command post current operations cell. Students fill roles and responsibilities of the functional staff elements and commanders of subordinate units engaged in concurrent full spectrum operations. Other students perform duties as the opposing force (OPFOR), while additional groups of students work as simulation coordinators and provide other white cell (higher command) functions. Up to sixteen-students (or 25 percent of the student staff section) are employed as exercise support for W299 and thus do not directly participate in the application / assessment portion of the block.

The major task for stability operations that the student-planning group addresses during Phase IV (Stabilize) is to restore the international border and re-establish security in Azerbaijan, to include establishment of a demilitarized zone and restoration of essential services to the Azerbaijani population (CJFLCC OPLAN 2006, 6). Other tasks include support for infrastructure repair and humanitarian support activities.

Student assessments during the W299 exercise consist of a daily subjective (instructor) evaluation on the students' ability to analyze and solve tactical problems. Some of these problems involve stability operations issues. Other assessments include the students' ability to communicate orally (brief) as well as their contribution to group discussions and work. Specifically, the students work must demonstrate clear understanding of the following concepts:

1. Command post battlefield roles, functions, and essential capabilities

2. Relationship between division operations doctrine and branch-specific warfighting doctrine

3. The human aspects and physical limitations of combat

4. The difference between staff planning procedures and command post operations during battle (W299 Advance Sheet 2006, 4)

Since there is no graded objective assessment for stability operations during the W299 exercise, the learning levels or competencies gained by the student cannot be judged. Hence, while the stability operations curriculum content for W200 appears significant, the fact is once again the research cannot conclude to what degree the stability operations curriculum is contributing to Army leaders who are competent in stability operations. At best, all the research can conclude at this point is that students are generally made aware of stability operations as a part of FSO. To what degree remains an unknown.

W300, *Brigade Combat Team Operations*, completes the crux of the AOWC. It is a ninety-hour, six-lesson block, which focuses on BCT operations in an irregular warfare environment. The W300 block emphasizes the steps of the MDMP, during the Army Force Generation process for a BCT arranging its training and deployment plans. The employment activities in W300 emphasize FSO with stability operations predominating (W300 Block Advance Sheet 2007, 1).

As a reminder, beginning with W300, two additional tracks commence. A track is a program of instruction designation and is assigned to each student during in processing. This is designed to broaden the officer's knowledge and provide an opportunity to study subjects in greater depth (CGSS Cir 350-5 2006, 15).

Track 1 officers are AOWC Operational Career field Officers. Operational Career Field Army majors in attendance at CGSS make up the vast majority of officers in this track. These officers attend all of AOWC as their qualification course. Track 2 officers are Special Operations Forces (SOF). These are all U.S. Army Special Forces branch officers, U.S. Army Civil Affairs Officers and U.S. Army PSYOP officers. Enrollment in the SOF track is mandatory for these officers. The third and final track (Track 3) is the JAWS. The JAWS program provides a comprehensive, intermediate level, joint education for a select group of officers (CGSS Cir 350-5 2006, 16).

It is at this point in the academic year that all Track 2 and Track 3 officers cease participation in their original staff groups to pursue their specialized programs. In general, this programming decision removes select International and AOWC officers, the SOF officers, and all sister-service officer expertise from the staff group for W300. Each staff group loses approximately three to four students. All that remain in the original staff groups are the Track 1 operational career field officers.

The result of this programming decision effectively removes the students who possess the exact specialty skills most needed by a brigade in a stability operation setting. These unique Army professions (Civil Affairs, Public Affairs, Psychological Operations, Information Operations, and Foreign Area Officers), along with all the sister-service (joint) expertise and select international officers, generally miss the entire W300 block due to their involvement in the JAWS program. This denies the officers remaining (in W300) the educational benefit of these unique experts, their operational experience and varied planning perspectives, in a collaborative learning environment.

Two out of three block-learning objectives address stability operations as a standard. First, standard explanation of BCT organizations and capabilities should include assessing an historical brigade-level experience in a stability environment. This standard is the enabling learning objective for W301, *Case Study: Philippines 1900-1902*. Second, standard employment of a BCT in FSO includes preparing a BCT operation order (OPORD) that directs BCT employment in a complex stability operations environment, immediately following major combat operations. This standard is the enabling learning objective for W330, *Employ the BCT*. (W300 Block Advance Sheet 2007, 3-4).

Sixty-five percent of the assessed work during W300 is through classroom participation and group work. An individual take home exam, commander's intent for training and a commander's intent for employment (stability operations) make up the remaining 35 percent of the block assessment.

W301, *Case Study: Philippines 1900-1902*, is a very good historical perspective of stability operations conducted by the U.S. Army at the turn of the century. This lesson serves as a bridge from W320, *Prepare the BCT*, to W330, *Employ the BCT*. The lesson meets the learning objective (assess an historical brigade-level experience in a stability environment) by dividing the staff group into four groups. Each group then prepares and presents to their peers a different topic concerning stability operations in the Philippines. The topics are local culture and infrastructure; insurgents; U.S. BCT; and civilian population.

Student presentations answer a list of questions germane to its presentation. The questions best associated with stability operations concern law enforcement, local and

regional politics, religious groups, essential services, public infrastructure, and the organization of a society. Sadly, once more, the shortfalls of group work and peer presentation dilutes learning and creates uneven distribution of doctrine concerning stability operations throughout the lesson.

W320, *Preparing the BCT*, is a twenty-hour lesson conducted over five days. Important to this research is the lessons' learning objective concerning development of a BCT Army Force Generation Model training plan. A condition of this learning objective is that the students address stability operations training issues as a part of their training strategy for the BCT. This learning objective is addressed during the second day's session in three ways.

First, emphasis is on identifying what is different in a brigade's mission essential task list when conducting stability operations. Second, there is a twenty-minute student led presentation on DOD Directive 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, dated 28 November 2005, and the training implications of that document at the brigade level. While useful to a degree, the value of using a cabinet-level directive, whose applicability and scope are aimed nearly exclusively at the military departments, is open for debate. To finish, there are two additional twenty-minute student led discussions concerning training requirements for Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.

The culminating event for W320 is the training and deployment brief by the students. This presentation, along with the other in-class work, is graded as part of the 65 percent of the assessed work for W300 classroom participation and group work.

The issue of classroom participation and student group work making up the majority of assessments for learning, in lessons and blocks, has become a recurring theme during analysis. Chapter 5, *Conclusions and Recommendations*, will expand on this finding. W320 accounts for 30 percent of the total W300 grade. With the exception of the Commanders' Intent for Training (Individual Summative Assessment which constitutes 5 percent of students final W300 grade), all other assessments for W320 are for participation in student led staff group work, discussions, and briefings.

W330, *Employ the Brigade Combat Team (BCT)*, is a twenty-hour block in which the students plan, prepare, and assess actions required for BCT employment in a complex irregular warfare and stability operations environment. The objective of the lesson is to enhance the students understanding of the scope and complexity of BCT employment in full spectrum operations (W330 Lesson Plan 2007, 1). The Caspian Sea planning scenario has completed major combat operations. The focus for this lesson is on the MDMP for a Heavy BCT employment in Phase IV, Stability Operations.

One of two lesson learning objectives for W330 addresses stability operations. The learning objective, "Prepare a BCT Operation Order (OPORD) has "in a complex irregular and stability operations environment" as a condition. One of thirteen standards for the learning objective is to "compare legal considerations during stability and counterinsurgency operations" (W330 Lesson Plan 2007, 2-3). The lesson plan further articulates that this standard should be included by the students during their mission analysis brief (part of assessed group work).

In the W330 lesson slide packet, slides twelve through seventeen are very good in presenting stability operations information. The information comes from approved Army

doctrine for urban operations (FM 3-06 October 2006) and counterinsurgency (FM 3-24 December 2006). It covers the critical learning point of logical lines of operations that include infrastructure, civil security, essential services, governance, and economic development. Slide seventeen is essential because it shows the students where in doctrine the suggested measures of effectiveness and measures of performance are found for these logical lines of operations.

The assessment plan for W330 includes two areas of participation for staff group work and orders briefings (twenty-percent of overall W300 grade) and an individual Commander's Intent statement (10 percent of overall W300 grade). The Commander's Intent statement is for employment of a Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) in Phase IV, Stabilize. The Commander's Intent should cover the critical areas of purpose, key tasks, and end state conditions for the HBCT for Phase IV.

W399 is the BCT Battle Command Exercise and serves as the capstone event for the W300 block. The exercise is thirty-two hours in length, played over four days. The range of problems encompasses full spectrum operations. Scripted injects introduce these full spectrum problems to the student BCT staff. There are thirty-five injects, ten of which address stability operations, for the lead instructor to choose from. There is only time for a total of seven injects during the exercise. Thus, there is no way to confirm inclusion of stability injects or to assess their outcomes as it is up to each instructor to decide which injects are played during the exercise, and the students are given a participation grade only for W399.

In summary, 65 percent of the assessed work during W300 is through classroom participation and group work. An individual take home exam, commander's intent for

training and a commander's intent for employment (stability operations) make up the remaining thirty-five percent of the block assessment. While the W300 block contains a good deal of stability operations information and group work (four out of six lessons), since it cannot be determined how much students are retaining towards stability operations learning, the findings for W300 are not significant in terms of the study.

As stated earlier in this chapter, the history and leadership parallel courses continue throughout the AOWC. The history parallel is presented in two blocks during AOWC they are H200, *Military Revolutions* and H300, *Roots of the Contemporary Operational Environment (COE)*. The leadership parallel is managed in a single block, L200, *Leadership*.

Of interest, but not significant to this study, in the H200 block is the key word and theme of economics. The learning objective "analyze the impact of societal, economic and political revolutions on military institutions and battlefield performance" (H202 Lesson Plan 2006, 2) appears in seven of the eleven lessons in the block. While not presented in terms of the importance of economic development for a nation or region during stability operations, the dissemination of economic theory and its effects on military institutions and subsequent wartime performance has merit towards the larger goal of producing officers who are competent in stability operations. In addition, it is interesting to note that FM 7-100, *Opposing Force Doctrinal Framework and Strategy*, states that our current operating environment will be shaped by eleven critical variables, one of which is economics (2003, v).

H200, *Military Revolutions*, contains eleven lessons that give a broad perspective of the nature of revolutionary change and, through that perspective, some insights into the

challenges and opportunities the U.S. military faces today. The basis for assessment of performance in the block is participation in class discussions, a graded outline, and an argumentative essay (H200 Block Advance Sheet 2006, 1).

Forty-percent of the students' grade in H200 is for class participation. There is then 10 percent for the graded outline and the remaining 50 percent for the argumentative essay itself. The student selects the topic for the argumentative essay from six choices. While the choices do not directly add to a student's competency in stability operations, the argument could put forward in one of the essays that a solid economic footing for a country or region is vital to stability. As there is no direct evidence that H200 contributes to a students competency in stability operations, overall the finding here are not significant.

H300, *Roots of the Contemporary Operating Environment (COE)*, is the final parallel history component in AOWC. The seven lessons in H300 trace the course of conflicts and military developments that mirror the social, political, military, and economic challenges of the COE. The course focuses on the themes of people's revolutionary war, conflict termination, limited warfare in the context of the late twentieth century, and the advancement of joint warfare to meet complex evolving threats. Performance in the block will be assessed based on participation in class discussions and an argumentative essay (H300 Block Advance Sheet 2007, 1).

Very similar to H200, the key word "economics" and discussion of its importance and roles, appears in all lessons and is part of five learning objectives, although only indirectly related to stability operations as defined in the study. Fifty percent of the

students' grade is based on classroom participation. The balance of the assessment is gleaned through a three-page argumentative essay.

The essay topic choices given the students are: (1) which historic period, issue, or event most closely parallels the contemporary operating environment, (2) are analogies detailing the American experience in Vietnam and Iraq by today's reporters accurate, and (3) discuss key similarities and differences of people's revolutionary war (colonial America, Mao's China, Vietnam) and the war the U.S. is fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. While noteworthy in a general sense, the curriculum content for stability operations in H300 is not significant in terms of this research.

L200, *Leadership*, is the final leadership block in AOWC. The purpose of L200 is, "to analyze the attributes and competencies that make organizational-level leaders successful in full spectrum operations" (L200, Block Advance Sheet 2006, 1). L200 is a single block, presented in eight lessons. The block has one terminal learning objective, it is, "Analyze the attributes and competencies that make organizational leaders successful" (L200 Block Advance Sheet 2006, 1).

The key words services, governance and reconstitution appear in the L223 lesson, *Division Battle Command: Major General Petraeus and the City of Mosul, Iraq*. Again, while worth mentioning, this lesson is not significant in terms of the study. Using the Harvard case study, *The Accidental Statesman: General Petraeus and the City of Mosul, Iraq*, the lesson is a great avenue for deeper understanding of the consequences of senior leader behaviors and decisions in counterinsurgency and stability operations environment. The *Accidental Statesman* article was used also as a reading for the stability segment of the W211 lesson, *Division Operations Fundamentals*. No other key words

appear anywhere else in the remaining seven L200 lessons. The key words are not part of any lesson-learning objective nor assessed therefore, the findings in the L200 block are not significant.

The JAWS program consists of nine lessons presented as a single block, referred to as J300. The JAWS lessons run concurrent with the W300 block of AOWC instruction. Select students gain an advanced level of understanding of joint, multinational, and interagency operational warfighting through the JAWS program. The program focuses the student on performing as a joint staff officer at the operational level of war in an interagency, multinational environment (J300 Block Advance Sheet 2006, 1).

There are two important block-learning objectives in JAWS related to the research. The first is “recommend joint operational level plans.” For this learning objective, the conditions run across the range of military operations. As a standard, the learning recommendations include, “explaining the role of the Department of State in stability, transition, and reconstruction operations.” The second learning objective is, “recommend a joint stability operational plan concept.” The standards for this learning objective include “developing stability operations contingency plans” (J300 Advance Sheet 2006, 2-4).

J301, Introduction to JAWS, provides an overview of the JAWS program and summary of the block lessons. Students participating in JAWS are organized into three JTFs. Each JTF has a faculty team leader and is divided into four seminar groups of approximately sixteen students each. Each seminar group consists of a balance of Army and sister-service officers. Lastly, each of these seminar groups has two instructors from the Department of Joint, Interagency and Multinational Operation.

The JAWS students participate in two exercises. The first exercise, J299, is conducted with students from the U.S. Air Command and Staff College (ACSC), Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. This exercise is focused on the tasks of “Defend and Attack” at the operational planning level war. The focus of the second exercise, J399, is the new DOD task, “Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR).” This forty-hour exercise focuses on SSTR following major combat operations. Two student-planning groups analyze respective missions and jointly develop a concept for SSTR. Interagency representation provides essential planning insights, mentoring and training during the exercise.

Of the nine lesson plans within the JAWS program, three are significant at this point in the research. They are J304, *Influence Planning*; J305 *Interagency Operations*; and J311, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (SSTR)*.

The J304 lesson plan, *Influence Planning*, contains the key words, stability, security, transition, and reconstruction and economics. Stability operations are part of the lesson-learning objective, and assessed (in-group work) during the J399 exercise and are significant to the study. The J304 lesson teaches the importance of political, religious, and cultural knowledge when providing operational level planning support. The perspective of the lesson is operational level planning for reconstruction operations. The standard within the learning objective analysis is that “stability operations are a part of combat operations” (J304 Lesson Plan 2007, 2). Economic characteristics are a small part of the lesson, but important to the study. Specifically, the lesson addresses issues motivating economic behaviors of groups, technological levels, agriculture and trade,

financial structures and monetary systems. Class participation, as part of the larger course participation grade, is used to assess this lesson.

J305, *Interagency Operations*, contains the key words stability, security, transition, and reconstruction. The lesson uses case studies to emphasize interagency stabilization issues (Haiti, 1915-1934; Post World War II Japan; and El Salvador, 1980-1992). The lesson is key preparation for the J399 exercise that emphasizes post-conflict planning and the stabilization and transition to civil administration phases of campaign planning (J305 Lesson Plan 2006, 1). This is a very good lesson for stability operations in that the lesson addresses such key issues as transition and the fact that stability operations are resident in all phases of campaign planning. There are two assessment vehicles for this lesson, classroom participation and presentations. Classroom participation for the entire block constitutes fifteen percent of the programs total grade, so metered out over the JAWS lessons, this only represents about 1 percent per session. Not all students present during the J305, for those who do not present, their J305 grade is based solely on participation.

J311, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (SSTR)*, is significant in that this is the only lesson in the entire ten-month academic year, which specifically addresses stability operations. J311 is a six-hour lesson highlighting pre and post-conflict support to SSTR. This lesson includes a two-hour guest speaker segment filled (when available) by Professor George Oliver from the Joint Military Operations Department, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. Professor Oliver is a retired Army Colonel and former head of the Army Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

During the other four hours of class time, students present analysis of SSTR case studies for Operation Just Cause (Panama) and Operation Deliberate Force (Kosovo). This lesson is by far the best, most complete package concerning stability operations that the CGSC presents.

The assessments for J311 are focused on the lesson-learning objective, analyze joint task force, interagency, and multinational roles and missions in stability operations. This evaluation is against the students' ability to communicate relevant insights from the guest speaker, required readings, and their own applicable experiences and to present convincing and well-researched arguments in oral presentations. Classroom participation represents 60 percent of the lesson grade while the remaining 40 percent is group presentation of one of the above-cited historical case studies.

The JAWS J399 lesson is the JTF Planning Exercise. This is the second exercise in the JAWS program and the culminating event for the course. This planning process application exercise is a four-day lesson during which the students' role-play a pre-assigned staff position on the JTF Caspian Guard Joint Planning Group or the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe Optional Planning Team. These two planning groups develop an initial peace implementation plan, a transition plan for a transfer of authority and, lastly, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization peace implementation plan (J399 Lesson Plan 2006, 1).

The learning objective for the lesson (exercise) is to recommend a joint stability operational plan concept. Standards for the learning objective include developing stability operations contingency plans, developing a transition plan concept for stability operations that includes multinational, interagency, United Nations and North Atlantic Treaty

Organization components, and a joint stability operational plan concept (J399 Lesson Plan 2006, 2-3).

The student staff groups achieve these learning objectives through mission analysis of a European Command Warning Order and Supreme Allied Commander-Europe planning guidance. There is also inclusion of a joint interagency working group which arrives, is briefed and then begins work with each of the groups. During the exercise, learning objectives are met through a series of briefings, which include mission analysis, development of transition criteria, COA development for the initial peace implementation plan, transition plan for the transfer of authority, and the final COA recommendation brief to the JTF commander. The J399 lesson grade is based on the students' demonstrated understanding of the learning objectives through classroom and briefings participation. This exercise participation grade is 25 percent of the JAWS block final grade. Overall, 80 percent of the JAWS block grading is based on exercise participation, multiple student presentations, briefings, and classroom participation. The remaining 20 percent is awarded based on the individual final exam. All of these assessment methods account for the stability operations learning objectives, but again, not all students participate equally in a large majority of the assessed work.

The Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course--What Has Emerged

The AOWC "focuses on educating officers as command-capable brigade and battalion level commanders with advanced competencies as staff leaders to serve at all levels up to echelon-above corps. The driving theme is enabling and executing division and brigade fights, given that these are the Army's lead formations" (CGSS Cir 350-5 2006, 9).

The goal of this second section of chapter four is to answer the first four research questions according to the methodology outlined in chapter 3. Specifically, the analysis of AOWC curriculum sought to answer four questions: First, what stability operations curriculum content exists in the AOWC? Second, determine where in the course the stability curriculum is located (which blocks, modules, or lessons and where exactly in the supporting lessons plan). Third, determine if stability operations were a learning objective for the block, module, or lesson, in which it was found. Fourth, determine if that learning objective was assessed.

Key words for stability operations appeared in forty-eight out of sixty-five lessons in the AOWC. The matrix at appendix B articulates the details of these findings. Out of the forty-eight lesson plans which mention stability operations in the AOWC, significant stability operations curriculum content appeared in eighteen.

These eighteen lessons are significant to this research because they contained stability operations as a part of the lesson-learning objective and that objective was assessed in that particular block. While that appears to be favorable news, further examination of the assessment instruments reveals two points, one of which was unexpected. First point, as was the case in the common core course, not all tasks for stability operations, (as described in the November 2006 edition of FM 3-0, *Full Spectrum Operations*) are, in fact, assessed. Assessments for governance and, economic and infrastructure development were not found. The second point is the unexpected discovery of the large percentages of block assessment grades awarded for either classroom participation or group work. What this second point means is that the school

has no firm indicator on student levels of competency for a majority of stated learning objectives. The following examples from AOWC illustrate this last point.

Of the ten lessons in W200, *Division Full Spectrum Operations*, five have significant stability content, that is a task or key element of stability operations is a part of a lesson or block learning objective and there is an assessment for that learning objective. In W211, *Division Operations Fundamentals*, in the learning objective of recommend a division course of action; recommendations are to include critiquing the fundamentals of division level operations including stability. A four-hour session dedicated solely to stability operations, W211C, accomplishes this. Yet a review of the assessments for W211 below reveals that there is no assessment for stability.

Table 1. W211 Assessments	
A student can receive a possible 100 academic points during W200. Twenty-five (25) academic points come from W211. During W211, student performance is evaluated and points are awarded as depicted through the following assessments:	
W211 Classroom Participation	10 points
W211 Individual Work – COA Statement and Sketch - Defense	5 points
W211 Individual Work – COA Statement and Sketch - Offense	5 points
W211 Individual Work – Movement/Sustainment Concept	5 points
W211 Group Work – None	0 points

Source: W221, *Functional Staff Procedures--Military Decision Making Process*. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2006).

From W221, *Functional Staff Procedures--Military Decision Making Process (MDM)*; the mission analysis briefing is group work as is the course of action decision briefing. In W299, the seven-day culminating block exercise has class participation as its only grade.

W300, *Brigade Combat Team Operations*, is a very good block of instruction for stability operations. It includes an historical case study highlighting stability challenges for the Army at the turn of the century in the Philippines. The supporting lessons then lead the students to account for stability operations training issues for a brigade during the Army Force Generation “Reset / Train” phase. Finally, the students use MDMP to plan for Phase IV (Stability) operations based on the continuing Caspian Sea scenario. As good as all this is; the curriculum falls short in terms of assessment instruments that account for learning. Sixty-five percent of the assessed work in the W300 block is through classroom participation or group work.

The parallel history blocks presented during AOWC analyzes five major military revolutions and the key word “economic” is found in nearly every lesson. While not directly related to economic development in terms of stability operations, there are possible related learning points that could be taken. One of the most important themes found in the history lessons during AOWC was how economies affect defense spending and subsequent military strength and how secure, predictable economies provide stability for a country or region is vital.

One good example of this economic theme is H202, *The Dawn of Modern Warfare*. H202 discusses how “the growth of state bureaucracy better harnessed the resources of the state in order to build and maintain standing armies or fleets” (H202 Lesson Plan 2006, 1). An understanding of this “harnessing of resources” provides the students some appreciation of the lesson learning objective, “analyze the impact of societal, economic, and political revolutions on military institutions and battlefield

performance” (H202 Lesson Plan 2006, 2), as it applies to stability and nation-building efforts on going in Iraq and Afghanistan today.

A secure and honest government will properly harness national resources to improve the quality of life for its citizens. A well-paid, trained, and respected Army is generally one of the first requirements to maintain an acceptable level of security that allows a free-market economy to thrive. In this environment the international business community will start to invest in a country like Iraq or Afghanistan, thus, (in theory) creating even greater resources to harness, a bigger Army, resulting in even greater security and stability.

Nation-building is hugely expensive and will only move forward in a secure environment. Sound armies and governments provide acceptable levels of security which leads to stability and confidence in economic markets. The sooner a country like Iraq or Afghanistan can harness its physical capacity and leadership to properly channel its resources the sooner its performance in the world economy will improve. What this means in relationship to competency in stability operations is that a basic understanding of economic development (granted, not a revolution per say) to improve an unstable environment is vital in helping a nation to develop capability and capacity in various governmental and physical infrastructure in order to stand on its own.

The L200, *Leadership*, block during AOWC provides organizational level perspective on key areas such as negotiations, battle command, and leadership. The best lesson in terms of this research is L223 lesson, *Division Battle Command: Major General Petraeus and the City of Mosul, Iraq*. Again, while worth mentioning, this lesson is not significant in terms of the study. The in-depth study of General Petraeus and his efforts to

stabilize Mosul and larger portions of northern Iraq in 2003 is time well invested in the art of senior leadership to restore essential services, provide governance, and begin reconstruction of vital infrastructure.

Finally, the Joint Advanced Warfighting Course or JAWS; of the nine lesson plans within the JAWS program, three are significant to the research. They are J304, *Influence Planning*; J305 *Interagency Operations*; and J311 *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (SSTR)*.

J304, *Influence Planning*, teaches the importance of political, religious, and cultural knowledge when providing operational level stability planning support. J305, *Interagency Operations*, discusses stability, security, transition, and reconstruction. The lesson uses case studies to emphasize vital interagency stabilization issues (Haiti, 1915-1934; Post World War II Japan; and El Salvador, 1980-1992). Lastly, J311, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (SSTR)*, is significant in that it is the only lesson in the entire ten-month academic year dedicated to stability operations. This lesson is by far the best, most complete package educating students on stability operations, which the CGSS presents. The great disappointment for the JAWS program is that it is restricted to select officers and therefore is not significant to the study.

In the final analysis, the AOWC purports to “develop military professionals adept at making repetitive discretionary judgments and skilled in problem-solving under lethal, volatile, ambiguous, complicated, and uncertain circumstances within the spectrum of conflict in Joint, Interagency, and Multinational operations” (W100 Block Advance Sheet 2006, 1). In regard to this study and assuming the spectrum of conflict includes stability

operations, it is difficult to determine if the AOWC course descriptor is true because of the large number of assessments that are done on a participatory or group effort basis. As this is the case, it makes competency measurement impossible.

In closing, throughout the ten-month academic program presented by the CGSS, potentially significant stability operations curriculum content appears in both the common core course and AOWC. Across the board however, the assessment of stability operations learning objectives falls short. An example of this is that not all students need to answer the questions for stability operations on the C451 block exam. They can select to answer the questions regarding offensive or defensive operations instead. Therefore, in spite of being able to link the stability learning objective to the assessment instrument in C400, since not all students are assessed for stability operations, a measure of competency cannot be obtained. The same was found to be true in AOWC.

Not counting the JAWS curriculum (because JAWS is selective and not all AOWC students attend), two of the three blocks of instruction in AOWC have class room or group participation assessments (for the block) that exceed 50 percent. Specifically, 70 percent of the student assessed grade for W100 is group work. For W300, it is 65 percent. The recurring problem of group work and classroom participation as assessment instruments will be full addressed in the next chapter. Suffice to say here, a fair and accurate assessment of individual learning and competency, while working in a group, is difficult and inconclusive.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

You [*military professionals*] must know something about strategy and tactics and logistics, but also economics and politics and diplomacy and history. You must know everything you can know about military power, and you must also understand the limits of military power. You must understand that few of the important problems of our time have, in the final analysis, been finally solved by military power alone.

John F. Kennedy, USNA,
Annapolis, Maryland, 7 June 1961

The Global War on Terrorism has dominated U.S. national security strategies thus far in the twenty-first century. All of the services are fully engaged; however, the sharp-end of this effort is mostly land based and almost exclusively the domain of U.S. Army forces. As such, the Army contributes to and leads the vast majority of assets required for stability operations. The Army remains engaged in this protracted war today and will do so into the foreseeable future.

In fragile regions of the world, considered vital to the interests and security of the United States, stability in these governments, economies, and infrastructure is often the exception. The U.S., in prosecuting the war on terrorism, will continue to engage such regions, using all instruments of national power where security and stability issues may threaten the U.S. One only needs to point to the creation of Africa Command to preview the future. “The U.S. military’s unified command responsible for operations across Africa will help nations there confront poverty, disease, terrorism and other challenges that affect regional security and stability, U.S. officials said here yesterday” (Gilmore, American Forces Press Service, 15 November 2007).

The Army's operational concept is FSO. FSO includes the tasks of offensive, defensive and stability operations conducted overseas. Stability operations "encompass various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief" (FM 3-0, DRAG 2006, 3-12).

It is within the context of the Army's operational construct of full spectrum operations and specifically the task of stability operations that this research set out to answer the following primary question: does the resident curriculum for Operations Career Field Officers, at the U.S. Army CGSS, contribute to the Army's goal of developing leaders who are competent in stability operations?

Chapter 4 answered the first secondary question along with its four subordinate questions:

1. What curriculum does the school currently present in stability operations?
 - a. Which blocks, modules or lessons mention stability operations as a part of the lesson plan?
 - b. Where in the lesson plan is stability mentioned?
 - c. Are stability operations a learning objective for the lessons in which they appear?
 - d. Is learning assessed where stability operations are a learning objective?

This chapter will accomplish four final tasks. First, the chapter will include a summary of the findings from chapter four. Appendix A, ILE Common Core Course, Lesson Analysis Table and in Appendix B, Advanced Operations and Warfighting

Course, Lesson Analysis Table contain the details of these findings. Second, this chapter will answer the final two research questions:

1. Are there shortfalls in the current stability operations curriculum when compared to the five types of stability operations tasks articulated in FM 3-0, *Full Spectrum Operations*, and (DRAG Edition) November 2006?

2. What should the ILE curriculum include regarding stability operations?

In doing so, the research will identify shortfalls in the current curriculum (when compared with stability operations and tasks as detailed in FM 3-0, *Full Spectrum Operations*, DRAG, 22 November 2006) and make appropriate suggestions for improvements to stability operations curriculum within CGSS.

Third, the chapter will provide final interpretation of all results and the implications of these results and finally, the chapter will make recommendations for further study.

This study asserts CGSS needs to enhance its curriculum content for stability operations in order to contribute to the Army's goal of developing leaders who are competent in stability operations. The key to judging competency is through an assessment instrument that is tied directly to the standards of a learning objective.

This was a qualitative methodology study. The techniques employed were a combination of content and gap analysis. The analysis focused on the content of the curriculum for stability operations at CGSS for AY 06-07 using FM 3-0, *Full Spectrum Operations*, and (DRAG Edition) November 2006, as a baseline to determine shortfalls and provide recommendations to improve or increase the amount of stability operations content in the current CGSS curriculum.

Conclusions for the Common Core Course

Five lessons from the common core course were potentially significant to the research, they were: C301, *C300 Operational Studies Introduction and Overview*; C302C, *Major Operations and Campaigns*; C302D, *Contingencies, Crisis Response, and Support to OGA's*; C431, *Full Spectrum Operations*; and C441 *Fundamentals of Tactical Operations*. These findings were initially significant because the lessons plans contained stability operations tasks in their learning objectives and appeared to be linked to an assessment instrument. The assessment instrument therefore could provide some measure of contribution to learning (of stability operations by the student) thus making the curriculum a contributor to the Army's goal of developing leaders who are competent in stability operations. This did not turn out to be the case.

The research did find lesson plans in the C300 block with stability operations content as learning objectives. Unfortunately, the assessment instrument for the C300 lessons, (C308 Joint Operational Planning Application, COA Take Home Exam) did not assess all stability operations tasks; the exam weakly covered the stability tasks of essential services and support to economic and infrastructure development. The assessment did not address the stability tasks of governance and the tasks of civil security and civil control appear to be used here in the context of a force protection mission for humanitarian aid workers and their operation.

C400 is a very good block of instruction and where stability operations were found in C431, *Full Spectrum Operations*, and C441, *Fundamentals of Tactical Operations*, these lessons served as good introductions to stability operations at the tactical level. Regrettably, the stability operations learning objectives in these lessons and

for the C400 block are not assessed in the C400 block exam. Specifically, in part two of the exam, sections A through E, the student is required to choose just one question to answer in a short essay fashion. Each section contains one to five questions. In section E, specifically, there are five questions from which to select. Two of those five questions address stability operations. Since a student can choose not to answer the questions on stability operations, not all students are assessed on the stability operations learning objectives for C400. Therefore, even though the learning objective is linked to the assessment, these findings are not significant because not all students are assessed against the stability content of the lessons in C400.

Conclusions from the analyses are that, at best, CGSS common core curriculum exposes and introduces a student to stability operations doctrine. Since none of the learning objectives for stability operations are assessed properly, nor are all stability operations tasks included in curriculum, measurement of student understanding of the curriculum content remains unknown. As this is the case, the curricula's contribution to the Army's goal of developing leaders who are competent in stability operations remains unknown. Therefore, the common core course does make some contribution to the Army's goal of developing leaders who are competent in stability operations. However, because of the lack of assessment instruments (which all students take) tied directly to stability operations learning objectives, the degree of the curricula's contribution cannot be measured conclusively.

Conclusions for the Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course

Eighteen lessons in the AOWC could be significant for stability operations learning in the future. The research can claim this because, as was the case for the

common core course, the stability operations content and learning objectives in AOWC curriculum falls short of making a measurable contribution to the Army's goal of developing leaders who are competent in stability operations. Not all tasks for stability operations, (as described in the November 2006 edition of FM 3-0, *Full Spectrum Operations*), are assessed and, there are large percentages of block assessment grades awarded for either classroom participation or group work. The detailed findings for these eighteen lessons are at appendix B, AOWC Lesson Analysis Table.

In general, W100, *Operational Warfighting*, is a good block with regard to stability operations content; however it is not significant to the research because 70 percent of a student's grade for the block is for classroom participation or group work. Five out of ten lessons in W200, *Division Full Spectrum Operations*, have considerable stability operations content. As an example, W211C is a four-hour block presented as a part of W211, *Division Operations Fundamentals*. This lesson is dedicated to stability operations, but there is no individual assessment tied to the lesson learning objectives. W300, *Brigade Combat Team Operations*, is a tremendous block for stability operations content; however, the curriculum falls short in terms of individual assessments that account for understanding of stability operations content. Here again, for W300, 65 percent of the student's block grade is based on classroom participation or group work.

The Joint Advanced Warfighting Course or JAWS is an excellent program with a solid reputation. The best lesson for stability operations content during JAWS is J311, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (SSTR)*. It is the most complete package educating students on stability operations that CGSS presents. The enormous disappointment, research wise, in the JAWS program is

that it is restricted to select officers and therefore is not significant to the study. The positive aspect of the JAWS analyses is that the J311 lesson serves as the model for stability operations content. It is the lesson that all common core course students should receive regarding DOD stability operations policy, responsibility and current issues at the strategic level.

An important part of the overall educational experience offered at CGSS comes from the History and Leadership departments. While not significant in terms of the study to its overall findings, it would be erroneous not to mention some contributing lessons from each department. As was the case for the large majority of lesson content examined, the history parallel served to support the introduction and exposure of stability operations to the students. Worthy of citing in this context are H106, *Dirty Jobs and Doctrinal Development: The USMC Between the Wars* and H303, *Vietnam I: Insurgency*.

These lessons examine noteworthy points in history that included several operational deployments in support of unstable foreign governments and doctrinal development beyond both Army and Marine traditional roles and responsibilities. The learning points made in these lessons are that the current problems of Iraq and Afghanistan are nothing new; they are simply military experiences in other than war operations that have been forgotten.

The true aim of these lessons (the learning objective) is to illustrate to the students the “use of historical context to inform professional military judgment” (H100 Advance Sheet 2006, 1). The historical analysis includes the role of culture, political, economic and social factors as a part of conducting today’s operational construct (full spectrum operations) and specifically stability operations. The problem remains in the

measurement of the contribution of these history lessons to the student's capacity for stability operations today.

Complimenting the efforts of the history lessons, as a parallel course in support of the overall CGSS mission, is the leadership instruction. Again, while not significant in terms of the objectives of the study, the leadership lessons played an equal role in the introduction of stability operations to the student. The best example of using a stability operations background for leadership studies was L223 lesson, *Division Battle Command: Major General Petraeus and the City of Mosul, Iraq*.

Using the Harvard case study, *The Accidental Statesman: General Petraeus and the City of Mosul, Iraq*, the lesson is a notable avenue for deeper understanding of the cost of senior leader behaviors and decisions in counterinsurgency and stability operations environment. The *Accidental Statesman* article was also assigned as a reading for the stability segment of the W211 lesson, *Division Operations Fundamentals*. This fact, perhaps, could have had a lasting impression on student understanding of the many facets of stability operations had the Center for Army Tactics and Leadership instructors recognized the integrated learning opportunity. That is not to say that some may have.

While not perfectly synchronized in the CGSS schedule (the L223 *Petraeus* lesson actually took place one week after the completion of W211 *Stability* portion), here was a sizeable opening to integrate and assess the learning objectives from two different teaching departments. The leadership objective of “analyze the dynamics of division level leadership in full spectrum operations (L200 Block Advance Sheet 2006, 1) combined with the Center for Army Tactics W211 learning objective of “recommend a division course of action” (W211 Lesson Plan 2006, 2) is evidence of the collaborative and

reinforcing teaching methodology the school assumes its teaching teams coordinate and provide. Sadly, there is no evidence in either lesson plan directing that the responsible instructors from Leadership or Center for Army Tactics coordinated both presentations of the objectives or to synchronize assessment instruments.

In conclusion, for the study, the findings for AOWC are nearly identical for that of the common core course. The greatest shortfall found in both the common core course and AOWC is the lack of assessment instruments that are tied directly to stability operations learning objectives. This is critical because it is the learning objective that “describes the competency (performance) expected of an officer as a result of the educational experience and the learning level expected to be accomplished” (CGSOC Handbook 2006, 31)

Correcting the assessment to learning objectives (linkage) shortfalls would lead to a measurable degree of contribution (of the curriculum) towards competency for stability operations planning and execution.

Measurement of student understanding of the curriculum content for stability operations remains unknown due to use of assessments that do not properly measure individual learning. As this is the case, the total curriculums’ contribution to the Army’s goal of developing leaders who are competent in stability operations remains unknown.

Therefore, the ten-month academic year at Fort Leavenworth, as presented by the CGSS does contribute to the Army’s goal of developing leaders who are competent in stability operations. This is only because the curriculum serves to introduce and expose the student to stability operations. It is to what level of competency (did the student actually achieve the learning objective) that remains unknown. Three reasons explain this

conclusion. First, the mix of curriculum (the old and emerging doctrine) for stability operations; this inconsistency produces two separate learning experiences and perhaps then different competency results. This disconnect between teaching departments should be fixed to establish consistency in stability operations doctrine presented by the school. Second, the curriculum does not account for all five stability tasks found in emerging doctrine, specifically FM 3-0, *Full Spectrum Operations*. This fact results in incomplete presentation of emerging doctrine. Third and last, regardless of which stability operations doctrine was presented during the AY 06-07 school year, the individual assessment instruments used to measure learning were poor and the percent of total grades awarded (for teaching blocks and modules) is too high for group work or class participation.

Recommendations

Since the research has found that there are shortfalls in the current CGSS curriculum for stability operations and in the assessment tools used to measure that learning, this leads to the final question, what should the CGSS curriculum include regarding stability operations? To answer this question, the research submits the following recommendations. First, stability operations curriculum should be included in the ILE Common Core Course as a part of the C200 *Strategic Studies* block. The best in-house model for this (as far as subject content is concerned) is the JAWS lesson, J311, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (SSTR)*. Ideally, the subject would also be integrated in to the C300, *Operational Studies* block and C400, *Army Operations* blocks as well. This program change will ensure universal exposure of stability operations curriculum, for all Army Major's, at the three

levels of war. The actual lesson content and program synchronization is a subject recommended for further study.

Second, update and fully align stability operation curriculum for the AOWC with Army FM 3-0, *Full Spectrum Operations*, (regardless of its publication status). The five major tasks that make up stability operations should be integrated into the current planning scenario for Land Component Command, Division and Brigade operations throughout the AOWC curriculum.

Shortfalls exist in the current stability operations curriculum, when compared to stability operations as articulated in FM 3-0, *Full Spectrum Operations*, (DRAG Edition) November 2006. These shortfalls are for the most part more confusing than fatal. The research shows that some lesson authors and course block managers are not synchronized when it comes to use of current terms and use of yet to be approved doctrine. That is to say some lesson authors are sticking rigidly to approved doctrine while others are moving ahead and using draft manuals in spite of polite statements on covers reminding readers that the doctrine has not been approved. The problem is a lot of the yet to be approved doctrine has been spawned by the current operational practices in both Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result, the curriculum is mixed. That is to say some lesson plans contain approved (out of practice in current operations) stability operations doctrine while others embrace current practice found in yet to be approved Army FMs (FM 3-0, *Full Spectrum Operations*, being one of those).

Specifically, for AY 2006-2007, there was a mix of stability operations doctrine. Some lessons used the term and doctrinal content from Army FM 1, *The Army*, describing Stability and Reconstruction Operations (SRO) as a part of full spectrum

operations. Some lesson authors adhered to the approved doctrine for stability operations found in FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, and lastly, some lesson authors included stability operations as described in the new FM 3-0, *Full Spectrum Operations*. J. G. D. Babb LTC, USA (Ret) from the Department of Joint, Interagency and Multinational Operations provided the best light through the fog with the following instructor note taken from C302C, *Major Operations and Campaigns* “the range of operations, spectrum of conflict, and stability operations doctrine is still emerging. We only wish it were nested from NSS to DOD to Joint Doctrine to Army Doctrine, but it is not, although it is getting better as doctrine is being updated” (Babb, C302C Lesson Plan 2006). The school has a responsibility to the students to keep abreast of this doctrinal integration process.

The last word on shortfalls is the CGSS curriculum for AY 06-07 does not account for the stability tasks of governance or economic development. The Army would find itself completely responsible for these are two tasks absent any pre-arranged cease-fire agreements. The Army would then own these civil responsibilities until the security conditions on the ground allowed the State Departments, United States Agency for International Development to move in and assume that role in stability operations. This is an example of the vital curriculum that is currently missing in CGSS where stability operations are concerned. As a final recommendation to advance governance and economic development lesson enlargement the CGSS, the school should formally align itself with the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, a subordinate organization of the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle, Pennsylvania. In taking these actions the U.S. Army may in the future avoid such criticism as found below.

Prosecution of the right war in the correct manner will minimize the need for stability operations. Operation Iraqi Freedom as it turns out four years later is clearly the wrong war, prosecuted in a predictable manner where the post-operations--operation could not have been worse" (Record 2004).

APPENDIX A

ILE Common Core Course

C100 Foundations

ILE COMMON CORE		Key Word Found	Location in LP	Part of Learning Objective	Part of Block Assessment	Significant Content
Lesson Plan (LP) Number	Lesson Title					
C111	International Security (Strategic) Environment, Operational Environment and Full Spectrum Operations	Stability Governance	Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	No	No	No
C121	Foundations of Critical Reasoning	None		No	No	No
C122	Critical Reasoning and Writing Effectively	None		No	No	No
C123	Fallacies and Creative Thinking	None		No	No	No
C124	Mental Models and Historical Case Study	None		No	No	No
C131	The Army Leader Development Program	None		No	No	No
C132	Leader Development	None		No	No	No
C133	Instrument Interpretation	None		No	No	No
C141	Introduction to Media	None		No	No	No
C142	Media Panel	None		No	No	No
C151	Culture and Military Operations	Stability	Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	No	No	No
C152	History and Culture	Reconstruction	Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	No	No	No
C153	Religion and Culture	Stability Reconstruction	Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	No	No	No

C200 Strategic Studies

ILE COMMON CORE		Lesson Title	Key Word Found	Location in LP	Part of Learning Objective	Part of Block Assessment	Significant Content
Lesson Plan (LP) Number							
C201		C200 Strategic Studies Block Introduction	Economic Reconstruction	Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	No	No	No
C202		Strategic Concepts	Economic	Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	No	No	No
C203		National Security Organization/Process	Stability Economic	Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	No	No	No
C204		National Strategies: National Security Strategy (NSS), National Strategy for Victory in Iraq	Stability Economic Infrastructure Reconstruction	Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	No	No	No
C205		Department of Defense Organization	Infrastructure	Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	No	No	No
C206		Department of Defense Process	Stability Economic	Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	No	No	No
C207		DoD Strategies	None		No	No	No
C208		Interagency Capabilities	Stability Reconstruction	Scope, Student Readings, Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	No	No	No
C209A		US Army Strategic Capabilities	Stability Infrastructure	Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	No	No	No
C209B		US Navy and US Coast Guard Strategic Capabilities	Economic Infrastructure	Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	No	No	No
C209C		US Marine Corps Strategic Capabilities	None		No	No	No

C200 Strategic Studies (Continued)

ILE COMMON CORE		Key Word Found	Location in LP	Part of Learning Objective	Part of Block Assessment	Significant Content
Lesson Plan (LP) Number	Lesson Title					
C209D	US Air Force Strategic Capabilities	None		No	No	No
C209E	Special Operations Forces Strategic Capabilities	None		No	No	No
C209F	Space Operations Strategic Capabilities	None		No	No	No
C209G	Strategic Communication	None		No	No	No
C210	Strategic Logistics	None		No	No	No
C211	The Multinational Dimension	Reconstruction	Reading	No	No	No
C212	Historical Case Study: Suez Crisis	None		No	No	No
C213	Strategic Estimate	None		No	No	No

C300 Operational Studies

ILE COMMON CORE		Key Word Found	Location in LP	Part of Learning Objective	Part of Block Assessment	Significant Content
Lesson Plan (LP) Number	Lesson Title					
C301	C301 C300 Block Introduction and Overview	Stability	Terminal Learning Objective: Standard	Yes	No	No
C302A	Fundamentals of Joint Operations	None		No	No	No
C302B	Operational Design and Operational Art	Stability Reconstruction	Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	No	No	No
C302C	Major Operations and Campaigns	Stability Reconstruction	Scope, Learning Objective (Standard), Readings, In-Class PE, Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes, GNI (45 minutes)	Yes	No	No
C302D	Contingencies, Crisis Response, and Support to OGAs	Stability	Learning Objective	Yes	No	No
C302	Intro LP for 302 Module - Joint Operations Doctrine	None		No	No	No
C303A	USAF Capabilities	None		No	No	No
C303B	U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard Capabilities	None		No	No	No
C303C	USMC Capabilities	None		No	No	No
C303D	US Army Capabilities	Stability Reconstruction	Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	No	No	No
C303E	Space Operations	None		No	No	No
C303F	Special Operations Force Capabilities	None		No	No	No
C303G	Interagency Considerations	Reconstruction	Instructor Notes, Instructor Reading	No	No	No

C300 Operational Studies (Continued)

ILE COMMON CORE		Key Word Found	Location in LP	Part of Learning Objective	Part of Block Assessment	Significant Content
Lesson Plan (LP) Number	Lesson Title					
C303H	Multinational Operations	None		No	No	No
C304A	Joint Function: Command and Control	None		No	No	No
C304B	Joint Function: Operational Intelligence	None		No	No	No
C304C	Joint Function: Fires	None		No	No	No
C304D	Joint Function: Movement & Maneuver	None		No	No	No
C304E	Joint Function: Protection	Infrastructure	Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	No	No	No
C304F	Joint Function: Sustainment	Transition	Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	No	No	No
C304G	Joint Functions Practical Exercise	Transition	Tab E Instructor PE Cut Sheet	No	No	No
C304	Joint Functions Base LP	None		No	No	No
C305	Operational Law	Stability Reconstruction	Instructor Notes, Instructor Reading	No	No	No
C306	Historical Case Study: Guadalcanal	None		No	No	No
C307	Joint Operational Planning Process	None		No	No	No
C308	Joint Operational Planning Application	None		No	No	No

C400 Tactical Studies

ILE COMMON CORE							
Lesson Plan (LP) Number	Lesson Title	Key Word Found	Location in LP	Part of Learning Objective	Part of Block Assessment	Significant Content	
C411	Introduction to the Military Decision Making Process	Stability, Economic, Infrastructure, Transition	Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	No	No	No	
C431	Full Spectrum Operations	Stability, Essential Services, Reconstruction	Student Reading C400 Diagnostic Exam	No	Possibly	No	
C432	The Enemy: Assessment Methodology	None		No	No	No	
C433	Sustaining Army Operations	None		No	No	No	
C434	Commander's Role in Exercising Command and Control	None		No	No	No	
C441	Fundamentals of Tactical Operations	Stability Transition	Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes, Student Led GNI (50 Mins	Yes	Possibly	No	
C451	C400: Army Operations Exam	Stability Transition	Exam Questions	NA	Possibly	No	
C999	End of Core Course Exercise (EOCCE)	Transition	Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	No	No	No	
	Assessment Plan	None		No	No	No	
	Vignette Three: Stability Operations - Refugee Camp Destabilization	Stability	Appendix J	No	No	No	
	Vignette Guidance	None	Appendix K	No	No	No	
	Media Guidance	None	Appendix L	No	No	No	

F100 Force Management

ILE COMMON CORE		Key Word Found	Location in LP	Part of Learning Objective	Part of Block Assessment	Significant Content
Lesson Plan (LP) Number	Lesson Title					
F101	Transformation and the QDR	None		No	No	No
F102	The Army Campaign Plan and Modularity	Stability	Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	No	No	No
F103	Combat and Force Development	None		No	No	No
F104	Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)	None		No	No	No
F105	Material Development and Rapid Fielding	None		No	No	No
F106	Organizations and FMSWeb	None		No	No	No
F199	Force Management: Practical Exercise	None		No	No	No

H100 History

ILE COMMON CORE		Lesson Title	Key Word Found	Location in LP	Part of Learning Objective	Part of Block Assessment	Significant Content
Lesson Plan (LP) Number							
H101		Introduction: How Do Militaries Transform?	None		No	No	No
H102		The Impetus of Stalemate: The Combined Arms Revolution of 1917–18	None		No	No	No
H103		Building the Mechanized Beast	None		No	No	No
H104		Victory from the Air?	None		No	No	No
H105		Battleship vs. Flattop: The Debate Between the Wars	None		No	No	No
H106		Dirty Jobs and Doctrinal Development: The USMC Between the Wars	None		No	No	No
H107		Blitzkrieg: Return to Decisive Warfare	Stability	Scope	No	No	No
H108		Blitzkrieg Revisited: The Soviet-German Conflict, 1941–45	None		No	No	No
H109		Carriers on Two Oceans: Midway and the Battle of the Atlantic	None		No	No	No
H110		The Bloody Lessons of Island Hopping	None		No	No	No
H111		The Combined Bomber Offensive: Douhet Put to the Test	None		No	No	No
H112		Transformation in the US Military: The Past as Prologue	Stability	Apply	No	No	No

L100 Leadership

ILE Common Core Findings		Key Word Found	Location in LP	Part of Learning Objective	Part of Block Assessment	Significant Content
Lesson Plan (LP) Number	Lesson Title					
L101	Leadership and the Future of the Profession	None		No	No	No
L102	Organizational Culture and Climate	None		No	No	No
L103	The Psychological and Environmental Stresses on Soldiers and Leaders	Stability		No	No	No
L104	Training Soldiers to Kill and It's Impact	None		No	No	No
L105	Ethical Decision-Making	None		No	No	No
L106	War Crimes	None		No	No	No
L107	How Leaders Influence Organizations I	None		No	No	No
H108	How Leaders Influence Organizations II	None		No	No	No
H109	Organizational Leader in War Case Study: LTC Hal Moore	None		No	No	No
L110	Organizational Leader in War Case Study: LTC Robert McDade	None		No	No	No
L111	Group Presentation on a Contemporary Leadership Problem	None		No	No	No
L112	Leadership Philosophy	None		No	No	No

APPENDIX B

Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course

W100 Operational Warfighting

ILE Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course (AOWC)		Lesson Title	Key Word Found	Location in LP	Part of Learning Objective	Part of Block Assessment	Significant Content
Lesson Plan (LP) Number							
W111		Course Introduction and Scenario Update	Stability, Infrastructure, Transition	Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	No	Yes	No
W112		Okinawa Case Study	None		No	No	No
W113		CFLCC C2, Staff Organizations, Boards, Centers & Cells	Stability Transition	Conduct of Lesson	No	Yes	No
W114		Staff Functions: Battle Rhythm, Estimates, and Running Estimates	Stability Economic Infrastructure	Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	No	Yes	No
W115		COIN Study Methodology & Framework and the Philippine Insurrection Case Study	Civil Security Civil Control	Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	Yes	No	No
W116		Foreign Internal Defense (FID)	Stability, Security, Control Governance Economic Transition Reconstruction	Learning Objective Reading Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	Yes	No	Yes
W117		Defense Support of Civil Authorities	Stability, Security, Control	Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	Yes	No	No
W118		Historical Case Study: the French in Algeria, 1954-62	Stability Economic	Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	No	No	No
W119		Historical Case Study: The Soviets in Afghanistan, 1979-89	Stability, Governance Economic Infrastructure Reconstruction	Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	Yes	No	Yes

W100 Operational Warfighting (Continued)

ILE Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course (AOWC)		Lesson Title	Key Word Found	Location in LP	Part of Learning Objective	Part of Block Assessment	Significant Content
Lesson Plan (LP) Number							
W120		CFLCC Logistics Operations	Infrastructure	Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	No	No	No
W131		Joint Force Air Component Command (JFACC)	None		No	No	No
W132		SOF Support to C/JFLCC	Governance Economic Infrastructure Reconstruction	Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	No	No	No
W133		Shaping the Battlefield at the Operational Level	Stability, Security, Services Transition Reconstruction	Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	No	No	Yes
W134		COA Analysis: Operational Wargaming	Stability	Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	No	No	No
W199		The C/JFLCC Concept Development Practical Exercise	Stability Civil Control Services Transition Reconstruction	Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes FRAGO's OPSUM's	Yes	Yes	Yes

W200 Division Operations, Doctrine, and Full Spectrum Operations

ILE Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course (AOWC)		Lesson Title	Key Word Found	Location in LP	Part of Learning Objective	Part of Block Assessment	Significant Content
Lesson Plan (LP) Number							
W201		Division Concepts and Enablers	Stability	Learning Objective	Yes	Yes	Yes
W211		Division Operations Fundamentals	Stability	Learning Objective	Yes	Yes	Yes
W211A		Appendix A: Division Defense Operations	None		No	Yes	No
W211B		Appendix B: Division Offense Operations	None		No	Yes	No
W211C		Appendix C: Division Stability Operations	Stability	Learning Objective	Yes	Yes	Yes
W211D		Appendix D: Division Movement and Sustainment Operations	Stability	Learning Objective	Yes	Yes	Yes
W221		Functional Staff Procedures – Military Decision Making Process	Stability	Learning Objective	Yes	Yes	Yes
W221		Appendix C: Scenario Products: Enclosure 1: INTSUM	None		NA	NA	NA
W221		Appendix C: Scenario Products: Enclosure 2: OPSUM	None		NA	NA	NA
W221		Appendix C: Scenario Products: Enclosure 3: LOGSTAT	None		NA	NA	NA
W221		Appendix C: Scenario Products: Encl 4: CDR INITIAL GUIDE	None		NA	NA	NA
W221		Appendix C: Scenario Products: Enclosure 5: CDR INTENT	Stability Civil Security Reconstruction	Appendix C: Scenario Products: Enclosure 5: CDR INTENT	Yes	Yes	Yes
W221		Appendix C: Scenario Products: Encl 6: CDR PLAN GUIDE	Stability Infrastructure Transition	Appendix C: Scenario Products: Encl 6: CDR PLAN GUIDE	Yes	Yes	Yes
W299		Division Operations Exercise	Stability	Learning Objective	Yes	Yes	Yes

W300 Brigade Combat Team Operations

ILE Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course (AOWC)		Key Word Found	Location in LP	Part of Learning Objective	Part of Block Assessment	Significant Content
Lesson Plan (LP) Number	Lesson Title					
W301	Case Study: Philippines 1900-1902	Stability, Civil Infrastructure Economic	Scope, Case Study, Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	Yes	Yes	Yes
W310	Analyze the BCT	None		No	Yes	No
W310A	Close Air Support	None		No	No	No
W320	Prepare the BCT	Stability	Learning Objective Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	Yes	Yes	Yes
W330	Employ the BCT	Stability Transition	Scope, Learning Objective, Readings Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	Yes	Yes	Yes
W399	BCT: Battle Command Exercise	Stability	Scope Learning Objectives, MESL Injects	Yes	Yes	Yes

Joint Advanced Warfighter Studies

ILE Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course (AOWC)						
Lesson Plan (LP) Number	Lesson Title	Key Word Found	Location in LP	Part of Learning Objective	Part of Block Assessment	Significant Content
J301	Introduction to JAWS	Stability	Terminal Learning Objective: Standard	Yes	Yes	Yes
J302	Joint Fires and Targeting	Stability	Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	No	No	No
J303	Operational Logistics Planning	None		No	No	No
J304	Influence Planning	Stability, Control, Economic, Transition, Reconstruction	Scope, Learning Objective (Standard), Conduct of the Lesson, Instructor Notes	Yes	No	Yes
J305	Interagency Operations	Stability, Security, Transition, Reconstruction	Scope, Readings, Conduct of Lesson, instructor Notes	Yes	Yes	Yes
J306	Combined Joint Task Force Planning Practical Exercise (CJTFF PE)	None		No	No	No
J307	Theater Security Cooperation at the Operational Level	Stability Reconstruction	Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	No	Yes	Yes
J308	Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) Planning	None		No	No	No
J311	Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (SSTR)	Stability, Security, Governance, Economic, Infrastructure, Transition, Reconstruction	Scope, Learning Objective, Reading, Conduct of Lesson, instructor Notes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Joint Advanced Warfighter Studies (Continued)

ILE Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course (AOWC)							
Lesson Plan (LP) Number	Lesson Title	Key Word Found	Location in LP	Part of Learning Objective	Part of Block Assessment	Significant Content	
J312	Operational Design	Economic	Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	No	No	No	
J312	Operational Design, Part 2	Economic	Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	No	No	No	
J313	The Road Ahead	None		No	No	No	
J314	NORTHCOM and Homeland Defense Case Study	None		No	No	No	
J399	Joint Task Force Planning Exercise	Stability Transition	Learning Objective, Reading, Conduct of Lesson, Instructor	Yes	Yes	Yes	

H200 History--Military Revolutions

ILE Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course (AOWC)		Lesson Title	Key Word Found	Location in LP	Part of Learning Objective	Part of Block Assessment	Significant Content
Lesson Plan (LP) Number							
H201		The Structure of Military Revolutions	Economic	Learning Objective Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Note	Yes	No	Yes
H202		The Dawn of Modern Warfare	Economic	Learning Objective			
H203		Frederick and the Paradigm Army	Economic	Scope, Learning Objective, Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Note	Yes	No	Yes
H204		Armies of the People	Economic	Scope Learning Objective	Yes	No	Yes
H205		Backlash to Revolution: The Decline of Napoleon	Economic	Learning Objective	Yes	No	Yes
H206		Explaining the Revolution: Clausewitz	Economic	Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	Yes	No	Yes
H207		Explaining the Revolution: Jomini	None		No	No	No
H208		Ironclads, Rifles, and Railroads: The American Civil War	Economic Reconstruction	Learning Objective Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	Yes	No	Yes
H209		Moltke and the German General Staff: The Brain of a modern Army	Economic	Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	Yes	No	Yes
H210		The Train Wreck of Revolutions	Economic	Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	Yes	No	Yes
H211		Conflict Termination and the Bomb (From Total to Limited War: 1945-55)	Economic	Scope Learning Objective, Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	Yes	No	Yes

H300 History--Roots of the COE

ILE Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course (AOWC)		Lesson Title	Key Word Found	Location in LP	Part of Learning Objective	Part of Block Assessment	Significant Content
Lesson Plan (LP) Number							
H301		People's Revolutionary War: The American Experience	Economic	Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	No	No	No
H302		People's Revolutionary War: Mao and the Chinese Experience	Economic	Scope Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	No	No	No
H303		Vietnam I: Insurgency	Economic	Learning Objective Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Note	Yes	No	Yes
H304		Vietnam II: Vietnamization	Economic	Learning Objective	Yes	No	Yes
H305		Limited War in the Modern Era	Economic	Learning Objective	Yes	No	Yes
H306		Interventions in the Era of Goldwater-Nichols	Economic	Learning Objective	Yes	No	Yes
H307		The Past as Prologue	None		No	No	No

L200 Leadership

ILE Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course (AOWC)		Lesson Title	Key Word Found	Location in LP	Part of Learning Objective	Part of Block Assessment	Significant Content
Lesson Plan (LP) Number							
L211		Managing Conflict	None		No	No	No
L212		Kadimayah Substation Case Study Analysis	None		No	No	No
L213		Freedom of Movement PE	None		No	No	No
L221		Division Battle Command	None		No	No	No
L222		Division Battle Command: MG Griffith during Desert Storm—1991	None		No	No	No
L223		MG Petraeus and the City of Mosul, Iraq	Services, Governance, Reconstruction	Conduct of Lesson, Instructor Notes	No	No	No
L231		Leadership Competencies in Combat	None		No	No	No
L232		Leadership at the Brigade and Battalion Level.TF Faith	None		No	No	No
L233		Darker Shades of Blue	None		No	No	No
L234		A Camp Divided Case Study	None		No	No	No
L235		Organizational Leader Priorities	None		No	No	No

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